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ABSTRACT 
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that no one but a “natural born Citizen” is eligible to be 
President of the United States.  Modern conventional wisdom generally holds that the phrase “natural born Citi-
zen” includes anyone made a U.S. citizen at birth by U.S. statutes or the Constitution.  But that conventional 
wisdom is under attack in academic commentary and open to doubt on textual grounds.  If anyone born a U.S. 
citizen is eligible, the word “natural” in the eligibility clause is superfluous.  Further, in general in eighteenth-
century legal language, natural meant the opposite of “provided by statute” (hence “natural law” and “natural 
rights”).  And plausible arguments can be made for a narrow meaning of “natural born” on the basis of either 
traditional English common law or eighteenth-century continental public law.  To this point, modern scholarship 
has provided no comprehensive response to these objections. 
This Article defends the broad view of the original meaning of the eligibility clause.  Although it finds that the 
usual sources of original meaning—the Constitution’s drafting and ratifying history, and contemporaneous com-
mentary—are inconclusive on the meaning of “natural born,” it argues that meaning of the phrase in English law 
provides a useful guide.  Under traditional English common law, a “natural born subject” meant, with minor 
exceptions, only a person born in English territory.  But beginning in the seventeenth century, in a succession of 
Acts, Parliament extended the meaning of “natural born” to include some persons born abroad to English parents.  
In adopting the phrase “natural born” from English law, the American framers likely understood that they were 
using a phrase without a fixed definition and subject to at least some legislative alteration through the naturaliza-
tion power.  That conclusion in turn provides support for the modern view that Congress can create categories of 
“natural born” citizens by statute, although that power is likely subject to some limitation to preserve the original 
purpose of the eligibility clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that only a “natural 
born Citizen” is eligible to be President.1  Until recently, modern conven-
tional wisdom generally held that this phrase includes anyone made a U.S. 
citizen at birth by U.S. statutes or the Constitution, including those born 
abroad with a U.S. citizen parent.2   
That conventional wisdom increasingly has come under attack from an 
array of articles and commentary arguing that under the Constitution’s orig-
inal meaning, “natural born” status attached only to persons born in the 
	
 * Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Director of International and Compar-
ative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School.  Thanks to Akhil Amar, Randy Barnett, 
Laurence Claus, Einer Elhauge, Richard Izquierdo, John Mikhail, Robert Natelson, Lisa Ramsey, 
Michael Rappaport, Thomas H. Lee, Maimon Schwarzschild, Lawrence Solum, Seth Barrett Till-
man, John Vlahoplus, and participants in the Georgetown University Law Center’s Constitutional 
Law Colloquium and the Seventh Annual Hugh & Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-
in-Progress Conference at the University of San Diego for helpful comments.  The author was born 
outside the United States to U.S. citizen parents. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 2 See, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 164 (2005) (equating “natural 
born Citizen” with “citizen at the time of his birth.”); Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning 
of “Natural Born Citizen”, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 161, 161 (2015) (arguing that the phrase “nat-
ural born Citizen” means “someone who was a U.S. citizen at birth with no need to go through a 
naturalization proceeding at some later time”).  A U.S. statute makes most people born outside the 
United States to at least one U.S. citizen parent a citizen of the United States at birth.  Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2016).  People in this category—along with those 
born within the United States and therefore citizens under the first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—are thought to be eligible for the presidency.  See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42097, QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE “NATURAL BORN” CITIZENSHIP 
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT 50 (2011) (concluding that “the majority of scholarship on the subject” 
indicates that birth abroad to at least one citizen parent is sufficient for natural born citizen status).  
George Romney (born in Mexico) and John McCain (born in the Panama Canal Zone) ran for 
President (in 1968 and 2008, respectively) without sustained objections to their eligibility. 
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United States,3 or only to a subset of those born abroad.4  In contrast, despite 
the confident ring of the conventional wisdom, there are essentially no sus-
tained scholarly defenses of it.  Its leading recent affirmation is only four 
pages long,5 and other scholarly examinations have found the clause myste-
rious and ambiguous.6  As a result, in the most recent election cycle, the 
clause provoked extraordinary attention and controversy.7 
	
 3 See, e.g., Mary Brigid McManamon, The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 317, 347 (2015) [hereinafter McManamon, Natural Born Citizen Clause]; John Vlahoplus, 
Toward Natural Born Derivative Citizenship, 7 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUDS. (forthcoming 2018).  For lead-
ing legal scholars taking this view in popular commentary, especially as applied to the presidential 
campaign of Senator Ted Cruz, see, for example, Einer Elhauge, Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible to Run for 
President: A Harvard Law Professor Close-Reads the Constitution, SALON (Jan. 20, 2016, 9:37 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2016/01/20/ted_cruz_is_not_eligible_to_run_for_president_a_har-
vard_law_professor_close_reads_the_constitution/; Laurence H. Tribe, Under Ted Cruz’s Own Logic, 
He’s Ineligible for the White House, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opin-
ion/2016/01/11/through-ted-cruz-constitutional-looking-glass/zvKE6qpF31q2RsvPO9nGoK/ 
story.html; Eric Posner, Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible to Be President, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2016, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2016/02/trump_is_right 
_ted_cruz_is_not_eligible_to_be_president.html; Mary Brigid McManamon, Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible 
to be President, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ted-cruz-is-
not-eligible-to-be-president/2016/01/12/1484a7d0-b7af-11e5-99f3-184bc379b12d_story.html.   
 4 Thomas H. Lee, “Natural Born Citizen,” 67 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (2017) (arguing that, at the time 
of the adoption of the Constitution, natural born citizenship was conferred only upon children of 
male citizens born abroad); Thomas Lee, Is Ted Cruz a ‘natural born Citizen’? Not if You’re a Constitutional 
Originalist, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
lee-is-ted-cruz-eligible-to-be-president-20160110-story.html. 
 5 See Clement & Katyal, supra note 2.  Clement and Katyal principally rely on eighteenth-century British 
statutes, which, they say, “provided that children born abroad to subjects of the British Empire were 
‘natural-born Subjects . . . .’”  Id. at 162.  But as explained below, see infra Part II.B., these statutes only 
applied to persons whose fathers (or paternal grandfathers) were British subjects.  Modern U.S. law 
allows persons born abroad to claim birthright U.S. citizenship through their mothers as well.  
 6 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 22 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/solum.pdf, 
updated version available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263885 (re-
vised 2010).  Other leading scholarship on the clause emphasizes the difficulty of interpreting it.  
See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness 
and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 
B.U. L. REV. 53, 55–56 (2005); Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unre-
solved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968); Michael Nelson, Constitutional Qualifications for President, 17 
PRES. STUD. Q. 383, 383 (1987); Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 
2005 BYU L. REV. 927, 932–33 (2005); Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presi-
dential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 881 
(1988); William Jacobson, Natural Born Citizens: Marco Rubio, Bobby Jindal, Ted Cruz, LEGAL 
INSURRECTION (Sept. 3, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://legalinsurrection.com/2013/09/natural-born-
citizens-marco-rubio-bobby-jindal-ted-cruz/.  
 7 See supra note 3.  For commentary in support of the broader view of the clause, see, for example, 
Akhil Reed Amar, Why Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President, CNN (Jan. 14, 2016, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/13/opinions/amar-cruz-trump-natural-born-citizen/index.html; 
Garrett Epps, Ted Cruz Is a Natural Born Citizen, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/donald-trump-ted-cruz-birther-argument/424104/.  
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Not only does the previous conventional wisdom rest on surprisingly thin 
scholarly foundations, it faces daunting textual and historical challenges.  If 
anyone born a U.S. citizen is eligible to the presidency, the word “natural” 
in the Eligibility Clause seems superfluous.  To give it meaning, there should 
be some “born” citizens who are not “natural born.”  Further, in general in 
eighteenth-century legal language, “natural” meant the opposite of “pro-
vided by statute.”  Natural law was the opposite of positive law; natural rights 
were rights that predated codification.  The most obvious meaning of “natu-
ral born Citizen” thus is not a person who claims citizenship from a statute, 
but rather a person whose citizenship comes from the natural state of things. 
Nonetheless, this Article concludes that the broad reading of the Presi-
dential Eligibility Clause is correct.  It provides the first comprehensive de-
fense of the view that persons born outside the United States, if made U.S. 
citizens at birth by statute, are eligible to be President.  Contrary to what has 
sometimes been assumed, that argument is complicated and not entirely free 
from doubt.  As suggested above, the Constitution’s text seems to point in the 
opposite direction, toward an idea of “natural” citizenship arising from some 
connection to the nation apart from mere statutory status.  The drafting and 
ratifying history is unhelpful, as the clause was rarely discussed, and only in 
general terms.  Similarly, post-ratification discussions are inconclusive, or ap-
pear to point in different directions.  On the basis of the text and the most 
frequently consulted founding-era sources, the phrase appears to refer to a 
“natural” relationship to the nation that was incompletely articulated, or per-
haps incompletely understood. 
One might be tempted to stop there and declare the clause fatally ambig-
uous.8  This Article argues, however, that meaning can be found in pre-con-
stitutional sources, chiefly in the idea of “natural born subjects” in English 
law.  In brief, traditional English common law reflected an idea of “natural” 
birth within the allegiance of the sovereign, based only on birth within the 
sovereign’s territory (with minor exceptions).  These people were called 
	
 8 That is, it may be ambiguous in its application to certain categories of people.  See Solum, supra note 
6, at 5–6 (noting that most people are unambiguously covered or not covered by the clause, but 
finding that the clause might be ambiguous as to those with some, but not complete, connection to 
the United States at birth). 
The Fourteenth Amendment is not immediately relevant to the meaning of the Eligibility 
Clause.  It was ratified much later (in 1868) and did not purport to address the meaning of “natural 
born” citizen or the scope of presidential eligibility.  Although it established a class of people whose 
birthright citizenship is protected by the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and thus 
cannot be altered by statute, it did not preclude additional classes of people being given birthright 
citizenship by statute, and Congress has consistently recognized citizenship at birth beyond the 
constitutional minimum of the Amendment.  On its own, the Fourteenth Amendment neither as-
sured that everyone within its protection is “natural born” nor excluded those outside its protection 
from being “natural born.” 
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“natural born subjects.”9  Since the late seventeenth century, however, Par-
liament had extended “natural born subject” status to certain persons born 
abroad to English parents.  Crucially, Parliament did not merely give these 
persons the rights of natural born subjects; it declared them to be natural born 
subjects.  As a result, by the late eighteenth century, in English law the phrase 
“natural born”—contrary to its traditional meaning—had come to include 
those given subject status from birth by statute.10 
This Article further argues that this understanding of “natural born” is 
the one most likely recognized by the Constitution’s Framers.  The relevant 
features of English law were known in America through Blackstone’s widely 
read treatise.11  Founding era and post-founding sources demonstrate that 
American citizenship law was strongly influenced by its English predecessor; 
although American commentators did not make clear their precise under-
standing of “natural born,” the most likely meaning seems to be the meaning 
it had in English law.   
This understanding is strongly reinforced by the Constitution’s grant to 
Congress of the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”12  
The English statutes declaring certain categories of people to be natural 
born, even if not born in England, were called naturalization acts, and thus 
were understood as exercises of Parliament’s naturalization power.  Absent 
indications to the contrary, the best guide to the scope of Congress’s natural-
ization power is the scope of Parliament’s naturalization power.  Recovering 
this meaning highlights the underappreciated connection between the Article 
II’s Eligibility Clause and Article I’s Naturalization Clause.  As English prac-
tice makes clear, the power granted by the latter includes (within limits) the 
power to define the meaning of the former.   
The last point is crucial, because eighteenth-century English statutes did 
not recognize all persons born abroad with English parents to be natural 
born subjects; they recognized such a status for persons whose fathers (or, 
after 1773, paternal grandfathers) were English subjects.13  Modern U.S. law 
generally grants citizenship at birth to persons born abroad with either a U.S. 
citizen mother or a U.S. citizen father.14  If foreign-born citizens deriving 
citizenship only from their mother are eligible to the presidency, it cannot be 
because the American Framers adopted the English rule in effect at the time 
of the founding.  Rather, it is because the Framers conveyed to Congress, 
through the Naturalization Clause, the power to define “natural” citizenship. 
	
 9 McManamon, Natural Born Citizen Clause, supra note 3, at 320; infra Part II.A. 
 10 Infra Part II.B. 
 11 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 30 (noting the influence of WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES). 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 13 See infra Part II.B. 
 14 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2016). 
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The ensuing discussion proceeds as follows.  Part I considers the Eligibil-
ity Clause’s text and drafting history, concluding that nothing decisive can 
be found within it.  Part II explores the legal background of the phrase “nat-
ural born,” particularly its definition in English common law, English statu-
tory law, and the law-of-nations theory of the eighteenth-century Swiss writer 
Emer de Vattel.  Part III argues that the weight of available evidence shows 
the founding generation in America to have been most strongly influenced 
by English law rather than Vattel, and by the whole of English law rather 
than just its common law antecedents.  Part IV concludes that the most likely 
meaning of the Eligibility Clause combined with the Naturalization Clause 
is that the Constitution adopted the English practice of a core common law 
definition subject to modification by statute—a reading that confirms the 
modern understanding of eligibility. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT AND DRAFTING HISTORY 
The Presidential Eligibility Clause provides: 
No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to 
the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office 
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen 
years a Resident within the United States.15 
The clause thus creates two categories of eligible citizens (albeit only one 
relevant in modern times): (1) persons who are natural born citizens, and (2) 
persons who were citizens of the United States when the Constitution was 
adopted.  Some interpreters have purported to be confused by the comma 
after “United States,” which under modern grammatical conventions indi-
cates that the phrase “at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution” mod-
ifies both “natural born Citizen” and “Citizen of the United States.”  This 
confusion seems misguided.  As other sections of the Constitution indicate, 
the Framers had different and looser rules regarding comma placement than 
we do; moreover, attaching significance to the comma creates a manifestly 
absurd result—namely, that no person born after the adoption of the Con-
stitution would be eligible to be President. 
That leaves the question of the meaning of “natural born Citizen.”  Ac-
cording to a study by the Congressional Research Service, the phrase means 
any person who is a U.S. citizen by birth, including those whose citizenship 
is granted by statute.16  This broad view, however, is in substantial tension 
with the clause’s text on two grounds. 
	
 15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 16 MASKELL, supra note 2, at 50. 
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First, reading the clause in this way violates the surplusage canon, which 
holds that in textual interpretation all words in a text should be given mean-
ing.17  If all persons who are born citizens are eligible, the word “natural” has 
no effect.  The Framers could as well have written “No person except a born 
Citizen” (or perhaps “No person except one born a Citizen”) shall be eligible.  
An interpretation of the clause should therefore strive to find some meaning 
of the word natural.18 
Second, giving “natural” its ordinary legal meaning suggests the exact 
opposite of the conventional conclusion regarding citizenship derived from 
statutes.  In eighteenth-century legal language “natural” meant arising from 
the nature of things19—a usage reflected, for example, in natural law (as op-
posed to statutory law) and natural rights (as opposed to statutory rights).  
Under this common meaning of natural, “natural” citizenship should be dis-
tinct from—not coextensive with—statutory citizenship. 
Neither of these observations provides direct evidence of the phrase’s 
meaning, but they do suggest that the modern assumed meaning, at mini-
mum, requires further explanation and support.  On its face, the Eligibility 
Clause does not make all born citizens eligible to the presidency.  The critical 
question is the eighteenth-century understanding of “natural” born. 
The most common indicators of textual meaning—the drafting and rati-
fying history—are not helpful in finding a conclusive meaning.  The initial 
draft of the Presidential Eligibility Clause came from the Committee of De-
tail’s August 22, 1787 report, and required only that the President be “of the 
age of thirty five years, and a Citizen of the United States, and shall have 
been an Inhabitant thereof for Twenty one years.”20  The “natural born” 
language first appeared in the Committee of Eleven report on September 4, 
	
 17 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 174 (2012). 
 18 Alexander Hamilton’s written plan for the Constitution, which he gave to Madison near the close 
of the Convention, had a presidential eligibility clause similar to the one adopted in the Constitution 
but omitting the word “natural”: “No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United 
States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United 
States.” 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 629 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS].  That appears to provide exactly what the modern consensus 
thinks the Eligibility Clause provides.  However, the actual text does not say “born a citizen” but 
instead adopted (without explanation) the phrase “natural born.”  Perhaps it was understood as a 
synonym, but that is far from obvious. 
 19 See JOHN ASH, NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775); 2 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1349–50 (1755); NATHAN 
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1721).   
 20 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 18, at 367.  The Committee of Detail’s initial report, which had 
no presidential eligibility requirements, was delivered to the Convention on August 6, id. at 176, 
and several additional matters (although not presidential eligibility specifically) were referred back 
to the Committee on August 18 and 20, id. at 333, 342–43.  The Committee then issued an addi-
tional report on August 22, recommending eligibility requirements. 
	
206 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20.2 
in substantially its current form,21 without explanation, and apparently it was 
not debated by the Convention:  
The Committee of Eleven did not explain why this new language had been 
added.  The Convention approved this portion of the proposals without de-
bate.  The draft Constitution was then referred to a second Committee of 
Five, known as the Committee on Style and Arrangement or the Committee 
on Revision.  That Committee retained the presidential qualification clause 
without comment, and without substantial change.  It was adopted in this 
form, and without any debate, by the Convention.  Indeed, no explanation 
of the origin or purpose of the presidential qualification clause appears any-
where in the recorded deliberations of the Convention.22 
There is some evidence, though, that the phrase had its origins with Sec-
retary of Foreign Affairs and future Federalist co-author John Jay, who was 
not at the Convention.  Jay wrote a letter to George Washington, the chair 
of the Convention, on July 25, 1787, making the following suggestion:  
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a 
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our 
national Government; and to declare expresly that the Command in chief of 
the american army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural 
born Citizen.23 
Jay did not elaborate what he meant by “natural born Citizen.”  On Sep-
tember 2, shortly before the phrase appeared in the Committee draft, Wash-
ington replied, thanking Jay for “the hints contained in your letter.”24  As one 
commentator concludes:  
Because the second version of the presidential requirements came a mere 
two days following Jay’s letter to Washington and was adopted without dis-
cussion, and considering Washington’s considerable presence at the conven-
tion, it is entirely possible that Jay’s reasons for including the natural-born 
requirement were the primary motivations behind the provision: namely, 
fear of foreign dominance of government.25 
Some writers have gone further to speculate that Jay had a particular 
person in mind for exclusion: Baron von Steuben, the Prussian officer who 
had been a principal aide to General Washington during the Revolutionary 
War, but who was regarded as untrustworthy as a result of some subsequent 
activities.26  (Jay was thinking only of the office of Commander-in-Chief; 
	
 21 Id. at 498.  The Committee of Eleven, composed of one person from each of the eleven states then 
in attendance, was charged with resolving important matters that remained outstanding after the 
Convention considered the Committee of Detail report. 
 22 Gordon, supra note 6, at 4. 
 23 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 18, at 61; CHARLES THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137 (1923).   
 24 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 18, at 76.   
 25 Seymore, supra note 6, at 938–39.   
 26 THACH, supra note 23, at 137 (“The name of [Baron] von Steuben is not mentioned, but there can 
be little doubt that it was he . . . with his sympathies for the followers of Shay, and his evidently 
suspected dealings with Prince Henry of Prussia, whom Jay had in mind when he penned these 
	
Dec. 2017] ORIGINAL MEANING OF “NATURAL BORN” 207 
because the Philadelphia proceedings were secret, he did not know that the 
Convention had decided to create a President who was also Commander-in-
Chief).  Other historical studies suggest that the Framers’ motivation was 
more broadly a concern over the ambitions of foreign aristocrats and would-
be monarchs.27  Professor Akhil Amar, for example, emphasizes the Framers’ 
worries that foreign noblemen might seek to become the American monarch, 
and notes that England had twice invited a foreign aristocrat to become king 
(William III and George I).28  Requiring natural born citizenship, rather than 
just citizenship, would avoid intrigues to naturalize favored foreigners (and 
potential monarchs): 
The apparent purposes of this citizenship clause were thus to assure the req-
uisite fealty and allegiance to the nation from the person to be the chief ex-
ecutive of the United States, and to prevent wealthy foreign citizens, and 
particularly wealthy foreign royalty and their relatives, from coming to the 
United States, becoming naturalized citizens, and then scheming and buying 
their way into the Presidency or creating an American monarchy.29 
Early commentary confirms the clause’s basic purpose.  Convention del-
egate Charles Pinckney later commented that the purpose of the natural born 
citizen requirement was to “insure . . . attachment to the country.”30  St. 
George Tucker, writing in 1803, described the clause as “a happy means of 
security against foreign influence” and as “guard[ing] against” the “admis-
sion of foreigners into our councils.”31  Although not speaking specifically of 
the Eligibility Clause, Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist 68—discussing selec-
tion of the President—warned against “the desire in foreign powers to gain 
an improper ascendant in our councils.”32  Writing somewhat later, in 1833, 
Joseph Story echoed these views:  
It is indispensable, too, that the president should be a natural born citizen of 
the United States . . . . [T]he general propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, 
in common cases, will scarcely be doubted by any sound statesman.  It cuts 
off all chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing 
for the office; and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of 
	
words.  The silent insertion of the clause in a committee where matters could be managed quietly 
tends to confirm the conjecture.”). 
 27 E.g., AMAR, supra note 2, at 164–65. 
 28 Id. at 165 (noting these fears and referring to the Eligibility Clause as “lay[ing] to rest public anxi-
eties about foreign monarchs.”); see also id. (“Out of an abundance of caution—paranoia, perhaps—
the framing generation barred not only European-style titles of nobility, but also European noble-
men themselves (along with all other future immigrants) from America’s most powerful and dan-
gerous office.”).   
 29 MASKELL, supra note 2, at 8. 
 30 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 18, at 385, 387 (recording Charles Pinckney’s statement in the 
U.S. Senate). 
 31 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 323 (1803).  
 32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 410, 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the most 
serious evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe.33 
While plausible, these observations provide limited insight into the details 
of the clause’s meaning.  It seems clear that the phrase was intended to place 
a higher bar on presidential eligibility than the Convention had placed on 
eligibility for Congress, whose members merely had to be U.S. citizens for 
seven and nine years for the House and Senate respectively.34  The events 
surrounding the drafting indicate a paradigm case of exclusion—persons 
lacking any plausible connections to the United States at birth—but standing 
alone they are not helpful in determining what connections at birth would be 
sufficient.  In particular, they do not make clear whether statutory citizenship 
at birth would convey eligibility. 
It also does not appear that there was any material discussion of the clause 
in the ratification debates.  And the one near-contemporaneous comment by 
James Madison is ambiguous.  In connection with the 1789 debate over the 
eligibility of William Smith to be a member of Congress, Madison empha-
sized that Smith had been born in the United States and observed: “It is an 
established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance.  Birth, however, de-
rives its force sometimes from place, and sometimes from parentage; but, in 
general, place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United 
States . . . .”35  While Madison emphasized birth within the United States, 
	
 33 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 
(1833); see also JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 96 (1833) (“Were foreigners eligible to the office [of the presidency], it would be an object 
of ambition, or of policy, with foreign nations, to place a dependent in the situation; and scenes of 
corruption and bloodshed, which disgraced the annals of Poland, might have been acted over again 
in this country.  The necessity of citizenship by birth, precludes this, by rendering it impossible for 
any foreigner ever to become a candidate.”); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 
255 (explaining that because of the Eligibility Clause “ambitious foreigners cannot intrigue for the 
office, and the qualification of birth cuts off all those inducements from abroad to corruption, ne-
gotiation, and war”). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.  In an earlier debate on August 13, Elbridge Gerry, speaking of the 
eligibility of members of Congress, had said that he “wished that in the future the eligibility might 
be confined to Natives.  Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no expence to 
influence them.  Persons having foreign attachments will be sent among us & insinuated into our 
councils, in order to be made instruments for their purposes.” 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 
18, at 268.  Madison and Hamilton objected on the other side and moved to eliminate the re-
strictions altogether.  Gerry’s suggestion did not come to a vote; the Hamilton/Madison motion 
was voted down, along with several others.  Id. at 268–72.  See John Yinger, The Origins and Interpre-
tation of the Presidential Eligibility Clause in the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Founding Fathers Want the 
President to Be a “Natural Born Citizen” and What Does this Clause Mean for Foreign-Born Adoptees? (Apr. 6, 
2000), http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/jyinger/citizenship/history.htm (discussing this debate). 
 35 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 404 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) [hereinafter 1 ANNALS]; see MASKELL 
supra note 2, at 24 n.111.  Smith was born in what became the United States but his parents were 
Loyalists who remained British subjects. 
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questions about extraterritorial birth were not raised and it seems that he 
deliberately avoided the issue. 
A further consideration is that in 1790, Congress enacted a naturalization 
statute, pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 power to provide a uniform rule 
of naturalization.  In addition to specifying the method by which aliens could 
be naturalized, the statute provided:  
And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond 
sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural 
born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to per-
sons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States . . . .36 
One might take the 1790 Act as indicative of the Constitution’s original 
meaning, at least to the extent that the First Congress believed it had power 
to define natural born citizens in this way.37  But no one in Congress ex-
plained the basis for such a belief or the extent of the power Congress under-
stood itself to have.38   
Moreover, the 1790 Act was replaced five years later by a new naturaliza-
tion act whose principal effect was to extend the residency period for aliens 
wishing to become citizens from two to five years.  As to children of U.S. citi-
zens, the new Act dropped the phrase “natural born citizen” and said only: “the 
children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction 
of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States . . . .”39 
The effect of the 1795 Act seems thoroughly ambiguous: was the key 
phrase “natural born” dropped inadvertently, dropped because Congress 
thought it was surplusage, or dropped because Congress had decided (for 
	
 36 An Act to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (1790) [hereinafter 
1790 Act] (repealed 1795).  Some modern commentators have doubted Congress’s power to declare 
foreign-born children of U.S. parents to be U.S. citizens at birth.  However, that objection seems 
insubstantial.  As the English practice discussed in the next section shows, making a person a subject 
by statute, whether at birth or otherwise, was called “naturalization.”  See infra Part II.B.  Thus 
Congress’s naturalization power undoubtedly extended to making a category of persons citizens at 
birth, as the 1790 Act did.  The difficult question is whether Congress had power to declare them 
natural born citizens. 
 37 See Clement & Katyal, supra note 2, at 162 (relying on the 1790 Act); see also Saul Cornell, The 1790 
Naturalization Act and the Original Meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause: A Short Primer on Historical 
Method and the Limits of Originalism, 2016 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 92, 93–95 (criticizing Clement and 
Katyal’s reading of the 1790 Act); Michael D. Ramsey, Originalism, Natural Born Citizens, and the 1790 
Naturalization Act: A Reply to Saul Cornell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 146 (2016) (defending Clem-
ent and Katyal’s reliance on the 1790 Act). 
 38 Debate on the 1790 Act—which was minimal—is recorded in 1 ANNALS, supra note 35, at 1058, 1110, 
1118–25, and in 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES: SECOND SESSION: JANUARY–MARCH 1790, at 529–35 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 
1994) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].  For further discussion of the 1790 Act, see infra Part IV.B. 
 39 An Act to establish a uniform rule of Naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that 
subject, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415 (1795) [hereinafter 1795 Act] (repealed 1802).  Naturalization 
acts thereafter did not use “natural born.” 
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constitutional reasons or otherwise) that foreign-born children of U.S. par-
ents should not be declared natural born?  Nothing in the congressional de-
bates indicates a satisfactory answer.  As with the 1790 Act, the clause relat-
ing to foreign-born children of U.S. citizens went unremarked, although 
unlike the 1790 Act, other provisions of the 1795 Act were extensively and 
sometimes rancorously debated in the House.40 
II.  THREE FOREIGN SOURCES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MEANING 
The Eligibility Clause received little contemporaneous explanation by 
the founding generation.  As a result, its meaning is best assessed by exami-
nation of eighteenth-century legal traditions that might have influenced the 
Framers’ understanding of it.  Of these, there are three, which unfortunately 
point in somewhat different directions. 
A.  English Common Law 
To begin, the phrase “natural born subject” had an established meaning 
in English41 law, and might reasonably be seen as a predecessor to the Con-
stitution’s phrase “natural born Citizen.”  Because the Constitution does not 
define most of its terms and uses phrases obviously drawn from contemporary 
legal language—ex post facto, habeas corpus, bill of attainder, and the like—
the English legal background with which its drafters were familiar is a rich 
source of meaning, frequently more useful and relevant than dictionaries, 
which defined terms often without reference to their legal contexts.42  As Chief 
Justice Taft later wrote, when considering the meaning of the pardon power:  
	
 40 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1004–09, 1021–23, 1026–58, 1061, 1064–66 (1793–95) (Joseph Gales ed., 
1849) [hereinafter 4 ANNALS] (recording the debate on the 1795 Act).  The lengthy House debates 
contain no mention of foreign-born children of U.S. citizens. The recorded Senate proceedings 
debates were minimal and unrelated to the relevant clause as well.  See id. at 809–12, 814–16.  The 
Senate passed the House bill with unrelated amendments, id. at 816, and the House acceded to the 
Senate amendments to produce the final bill.  Id. at 1133 (Jan. 26, 1795); see also infra note 140 
(discussing further debate on the 1795 Act). 
 41 For convenience, this Article uses “English” to refer to the law both before and after the 1707 union 
of the crowns of England and Scotland to form Great Britain. 
 42 The phrase “natural born” is not defined as a phrase (or otherwise used) in the leading eighteenth-
century dictionaries.  See supra text accompanying note 19 (citing dictionaries).  Yet the phrase ap-
pears to be used as a term of art in legal enactments (indeed, in some versions it is hyphenated), 
thus making its meaning difficult to reconstruct from the individual words. In any event, the defi-
nitions of the individual words are unhelpful.  For example, Johnson defined “Natural” as, among 
other things, “[p]roduced or effected by nature”; “Native” in turn he defined as (among other 
things) “[r]elating to the birth; pertaining to the time or place of birth,” “conferred by birth,” and, 
without further explanation, “[o]riginal; natural.”  2 JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 1349–50.  Bailey’s 
1765 edition defined “Naturalization” as “when one who is an Alien, is made a Natural Subject by 
Act of Parliament.”  BAILEY, supra note 19, at 566.  Similarly, Ash defined “Naturalize” as “[t]o 
make natural . . . to invest a foreigner with the privileges of a native subject,” with “Native” defined 
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The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by 
reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when 
the instrument was framed and adopted.  The statesmen and lawyers of the 
Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the 
thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common 
law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary.  They were familiar with other 
forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions 
earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to 
put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, 
they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could 
be shortly and easily understood.43 
Under English common law, a natural born subject—consistent with the 
common legal meaning of “natural”—was one whose subjectship arose from 
the nature of things.  As Blackstone explained: 
The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natu-
ral-born subjects.  Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the do-
minions of the crown of England, that is, within the ligeance, or as it is gen-
erally called, the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it.  
Allegiance is the tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return 
for that protection which the king affords the subject.  The thing itself, or 
substantial part of it, is founded in reason and the nature of government; the 
name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic ancestors.44 
	
(following Johnson) as both “[o]ne born in any place, an original inhabitant” and “conferred by 
birth.” 2 ASH, supra note 19 (definitions of “Natural,” “Naturalized” and “Native.”). 
 43 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–09 (1925); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390–91 
(1798) (Chase, J.) (“The prohibition, ‘that no state shall pass any ex post facto law,’ necessarily requires 
some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and means noth-
ing. . . . The expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they had been in use long before the Revo-
lution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.”); United 
States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (“As [the pardon] power had been 
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, 
and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting 
the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner 
in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.”); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 
465, 478 (1888) (“The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influ-
enced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and 
are to be read in the light of its history.”); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521 (2000) (relying on 
Calder and the English common law meaning of “ex post facto” to interpret the Ex Post Facto 
Clause); MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1 (noting relevance of eighteenth-century common law to the 
Eligibility Clause under these precedents and explaining, “Although the English common law is not 
‘binding’ on federal courts in interpreting the meaning of words or phrases within the Constitution, 
nor is it necessarily to be considered the ‘law’ of the United States (as it is for the individual states 
specifically incorporating it), it can be employed to shed light on the concepts and precepts within 
the document that are not defined there, but which are reflected in the corpus of British law and 
jurisprudence of the time.”); Clement & Katyal, supra note 2, at 161 (noting English common law 
as an important source of constitutional meaning). 
 44 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *354. 
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Blackstone then noted some minor exceptions: 
When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king’s dominions, 
or allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions.  The com-
mon law indeed stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so that 
a particular act of parliament became necessary after the restoration, for the 
naturalization of children of his majesty’s English subjects, born in foreign 
countries during the late troubles.  And this maxim of the law proceeded 
upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he 
is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or serve two masters, at once.45 
The principal common law exception, Blackstone noted, was that “the 
children of the king’s embassadors born abroad were always held to be natural 
subjects: for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not even a local 
allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he 
was held (by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England’s alle-
giance, represented by his father, the embassador.”46  On the other hand, 
Blackstone added, “[t]he children of aliens, born here in England, are, gener-
ally speaking, natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the privileges of such.”47 
Thus anyone reading Blackstone (as the Framers did) would understand 
English common law to tie “natural born” very closely to birth within English 
territory.  As Blackstone explained, this was a “natural” relationship in that 
it arose not from an act of Parliament but from the nature of the relationship 
between the person and the monarch: the monarch granted protection in 
return for allegiance.48 
Although Blackstone was not always reliable in his accounts of English 
law, on this point his description conforms to later historical descriptions.  
One such account described the common law as follows: 
By the common law all persons born within the power or protection of the 
Crown owe natural allegiance to the King, and are natural-born subjects of 
the realm, while all born out of the allegiance or protection of the King are 
aliens born, and remain aliens unless they are subsequently made denizens or 
naturalized.  For the law of England has always adopted the feudal or terri-
torial principle of determining nationality by the place of birth alone . . . .49 
This account also confirmed Blackstone’s recognition of narrow excep-
tions for children of ambassadors, whose nationality was determined by that 
	
 45 Id. at *361. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at *361–62. 
 48 Id. at *354–55.  This understanding comports with contemporaneous dictionary definitions of “nat-
ural” as that arising from nature.  See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 49 HENRY S.Q. HENRIQUES, THE LAW OF ALIENS AND NATURALIZATION 29 (1906); see also id. at 62 
(“[T]he general effect [of the common law rule] is, that persons born within the dominions of the 
King, whether of English or foreign parents, are natural-born subjects, and that persons born with-
out his dominions are aliens.”). 
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of their father, not of their place of birth, and the children of others who did 
not owe even temporary allegiance to the territorial sovereign: 
[A] person, though born within the realm may yet be an alien, if he is born 
in such circumstances that he cannot be held from the moment of his birth 
to owe allegiance to the King.  Such, for instance, are the children of persons 
who, by the comity of nations, recognised by our courts as international 
law, are looked upon as being ex-territorial, e.g., a foreign sovereign or his 
ambassador or accredited minister; such also are the children of alien ene-
mies, who, as members of an invading army, may have succeeded in occu-
pying part of the King’s territory, for these cannot be considered to be even 
temporarily subjects of the King, for where no protection can be claimed, 
no allegiance can be due.50 
As numerous sources emphasize, these rules of English common law trace 
their traditional exposition to Calvin’s Case,51 as reported by Sir Edward Coke 
in the early seventeenth century.  The precise issue there was the status of a 
person born in Scotland after King James of Scotland also became King of 
England.  The case, however, contains substantial discussion of the English 
common law of subjectship, setting forth the strong birth-within-sovereign 
territory approach repeated in Blackstone and later historical accounts.52 
In sum, the traditional English common law was that a “natural born” 
subject was only one born within the territory of the monarch, with narrow 
exceptions for the children of ambassadors and other ministers, and of in-
vading armies.  The touchstone was birth under the protection of the sover-
eign, which the common law understood to arise (except in unusual circum-
stances) from presence in the monarch’s dominions. 
If that were the end of the pre-Convention story, one might plausibly 
argue that only birth within the United States could convey presidential eli-
gibility.  It is, however, not the end of the story.  As described in the next 
section, in addition to the common law background England had a compli-
cated statutory tradition defining the phrase “natural born.” 
B.  The English Statutory Background 
A bedrock principle of eighteenth-century English law was that Parlia-
ment could alter, extend and re-define the common law by statute.  Despite 
	
 50 Id. at 29–30; see also id. at 62–63 (listing as “[p]ersons born within the Realm or other dominions of 
the King who are aliens born” as the children of a foreign sovereign, ambassador, or other diplomat 
and children born in territory occupied by a hostile army); id. at 63–64 (listing as “[p]ersons born 
without the Dominions of the King who are Natural-born Subjects at Common Law” as children 
of the English monarch and his ambassadors and diplomatic agents and children born “within the 
territory of a prince who is subject to and is bound to do homage to the King of England”). 
 51 Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.). 
 52 See Polly Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
73, 73, 139 (1997). 
	
214 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20.2 
the common law background of the phrase “natural born,” Parliament had a 
long experience of statutory intervention.  That is not surprising, for even in 
ancient times the common law rule created the practical oddity that the chil-
dren of English subjects traveling or temporarily residing abroad were not 
English subjects even upon their (and their parents’) return to England.  This 
condition had various difficulties attached, because under common law aliens 
could not own or inherent property and suffered other disqualifications.53 
Of course, aliens could be “naturalized.”  By this, it was initially meant 
that a change in status could be effected individually by acts of Parliament 
declaring particular named persons to be English subjects.54  Presumably 
Parliament commonly used this approach to resolve the problem of subjects’ 
children born abroad, as well as to make English subjects of aliens emigrating 
from their home countries.  At least in the seventeenth century and earlier, 
persons naturalized in this way by statute apparently had all the rights of 
natural born subjects.55 
Parliament also altered the common law consequences of alienage on a 
general scale as early as the fourteenth century.  As described above, the 
common law rule was that aliens could not inherit land, even from English-
subject decedents (including their parents).  In 1350, however, Parliament 
provided first that “the Law . . . is, and always hath been” that “Children of 
the Kings of England, in whatever Parts they be born, in England or else-
where, be able and ought to bear the Inheritance after the death of their 
Ancestors.”56  It further provided that the children of certain named persons 
“which were born beyond the Sea, out of the Ligeance of England, shall be 
from henceforth able to have and enjoy their Inheritance after the death of 
	
 53 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *360–61; HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 1–10. 
 54 HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 38–39 (noting an instance of naturalization as early as the reign of 
Henry VI but finding that “private Acts of Parliament of this kind did not come into vogue until 
the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth.”).  These private naturalization acts were common 
in the seventeenth century.  See, e.g., 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 159–60 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 
1963) (1820) (listing “Private Acts” of 1695–96 as including various acts for the naturalization of 
individual named persons); McManamon, Natural Born Citizen Clause, supra note 3, 348–49 (listing 
individual naturalizations); see also supra note 42 (listing dictionaries defining “naturalized” as having 
been given the rights of natural born subjects by statute). 
 55 HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 38.  As noted below, this full equivalence was changed by the Act of 
Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2 (1701) (Eng.), reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 636, 637 
(Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1820) [hereinafter Act of Settlement].  See infra text accompanying 
notes 62–64.   
English law also traditionally recognized the power of the monarch to make an alien into a 
“denizen,” which was a sort of intermediate status, in terms of rights, between an alien and a sub-
ject.  See HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 38 (adding that “the King by his prerogative could not grant 
the full rights of a natural-born subject”). 
 56 A Statute for those who are born in Parts beyond Sea, 25 Edw. 3 (1350) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 
STATUTES OF THE REALM 310 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1810). 
	
Dec. 2017] ORIGINAL MEANING OF “NATURAL BORN” 215 
their Ancestors, in all Parts within the Ligeance of England, as well as those 
that should be born within the same Ligeance.”57  Finally, it provided: 
[A]ll Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born without the 
Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers at the Time of their Birth 
be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the King of England, shall have 
and enjoy the same Benefits and Advantages, to have and bear the Inher-
itance within the same Ligeance, as the other Inheritors as aforesaid in Time 
to come.58 
By this provision, Parliament modified the effect of extraterritorial birth 
but did not use the phrase “natural born” nor purport to make subjects of 
aliens.  So far, the statutory view accorded with the common law view (taking 
into account Parliament’s ability to modify the common law): those born 
abroad, even with subject parents, remained aliens, but the consequences of 
their alienage were somewhat relaxed.  The 1350 Act did, however, begin to 
introduce the idea that those born abroad of subject parents merited some 
special consideration. 
Of greater significance was Parliament’s gradual claim, starting in the 
seventeenth century, to be able to modify the meaning of “natural born.”  
The seventeenth century posed rising challenges to the common law rule be-
cause, due to peculiar historical circumstances, unusually large numbers of 
children were born abroad to English parents.  In particular, the turmoil of 
the mid-century Civil War drove many supporters of the Crown (and the 
heir to the Crown himself) abroad for a substantial amount of time, resulting 
in many more “English” children being born abroad.  One may speculate 
that the system of private acts was too cumbersome to handle the post-Res-
toration demand for naturalization.  In any event, after the Restoration, Par-
liament in 1677 passed a statute, “An Act for the Naturalizing of Children of 
his Majestyes English Subjects Borne in Forreigne Countryes dureing the 
Late Troubles,” noting that numerous English subjects “did either by reason 
of their attendance upon his Majestie or for feare of the then Usurped Powers 
reside in parts beyond the Seas out of his Majestyes Dominions.”59  The Act 
then declared that all persons: 
[W]ho at any time betweene the fourteenth day of June in the said yeare of 
our Lord one thousand six hundred forty one and the foure and twentyeth 
day of March in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred and sixty 
were borne out of his Majestyes Dominions and whose Fathers or Mothers 
were Naturall borne Subjects of the Realme are hereby declared and shall 
for ever be esteemed and taken to all Intents and Purposes to be and to have 
beene the Kings Naturall borne Subjects of the Kingdome and . . . shall be 
	
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (1677) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 847 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 
1963) (1819) [hereinafter 1677 Act]. 
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adjudged reputed and taken to be and to have beene in every respect and 
degree Naturall borne Subjects and free to all intents purposes and construc-
tions as if they and every of them had beene born in England.60 
It is important to emphasize here that Parliament made a relatively nar-
row and precise change to the common law, applicable only to those born 
between 1641 and 1660 (that is, the interregnum period of the Civil War) 
and only to those who had fled England on account of the Civil War.  More-
over, by linking the statutory “natural born subject” category to the time in 
which the rightful king himself was out of the country, Parliament might be 
said not so much to be redefining natural born subjectship in general but 
accommodating a uniquely disruptive episode in English history.  At the 
same time, though, the 1677 Act was a departure from traditional practice 
in that Parliament did not merely naturalize a group of people; it specifically 
declared them “natural born.”  That approach lacked practical significance, 
however, since under the law of the time there apparently was no difference 
in the rights of natural born and naturalized subjects. 
The next step came in 1698, with “An Act to naturalize the Children of 
such Officers and Souldiers & others the natural borne Subjects of this 
Realme who have been borne abroad during the Warr the Parents of such 
Children haveing been in the Service of this Government.”61  The situation 
here was that King William III had spent extended time in his native Neth-
erlands directing the war with France, together with a substantial army and 
body of attendants from England.  As during the Civil War, that created a 
large group of people born abroad who were obviously English in every prac-
tical sense but who under the common law were not English subjects.  Adopt-
ing the form of the 1677 Act, Parliament began by noting (consistent with 
common law) that: 
Whereas during the late Warr with France divers of His Majesty’s good 
and lawfull Subjects . . . did by reason of their Attendance on His Majesty in 
Flanders and bearing Armes under His said Majesty against the French King 
and other His Majesties Enemies reside in Parts beyond the Seas out of his 
Majesties Dominions[.]  And whereas dureing such their Residence abroad 
divers Children have been borne unto such his Majesties Subjects which said 
Children notwithstanding they have been borne of English Parents yett by 
reason of their being borne in Parts beyond the Seas out of His Majesties 
Dominions may be interpreted to be incapable of taking receiving or enjoy-
ing any Mannors and Lands or any other Priveledges and Imunities belong-
ing to the liege People and natural borne subjects of this Kingdome . . . .62 
	
 60 Id.  The Act further provided that to gain natural born status the children in question had to receive 
the sacrament from the Church of England and take the oath of allegiance to the king; these pro-
visions were repeated in later statutes. 
 61 9 Will. 3 c. 20 (1698) (Eng.), reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 380 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 
1963) (1820) [hereinafter 1698 Act]. 
 62 Id. 
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Parliament then declared, again in the model of the 1677 Act: 
That . . . Persons who att any time since the Thirteenth Day of February One 
thousand six hundred eighty and eight or att any time since the beginning of 
the [said] late Warr with France & before the Twenty fifth Day of March 
One thousand six hundred ninety and eight which are or shall be borne out 
of His Majesties Dominions and whose Fathers or Mothers were natural 
borne Subjects of this Realme and were then actually in the Service of His 
Majesty or of His Majesty and the late Queen of Blessed Memory are hereby 
declared and shall forever be esteemed and taken to all Intents & Purposes to 
be and to have been the Kings natural born Subjects of this Kingdome and 
that the said Children and all other Persons borne as aforesaid and every one 
of them are and shall be adjudged reputed and taken to be in every respect 
and degree natural borne Subjects and free to all Intents Purposes & Con-
structions as if they & every one of them had been borne in England.63 
As in 1677, the adjustment of the common law operated in a narrow 
temporal window (1688 to 1698) and was keyed to a particular oddity of the 
King being substantially absent from the realm.  Moreover, the 1698 Act 
specifically applied only to those actually in the King’s service (that is, not to 
merchants or other persons abroad for other reasons, who presumably would 
still be governed by the common law as modified by the statute of 1350).  But 
also of note, Parliament continued the 1677 Act’s approach of declaring per-
sons to be natural born, even where the common law would not have given 
them this status (and doing so retroactively). 
At around the same time, the Act of Settlement in 1701, without men-
tioning natural birth, may have been the original English precedent for the 
Eligibility Clause.  It provided:  
That . . . no Person born out of the Kingdoms of England Scotland or 
Ireland or the Dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized 
or made a Denizen (except such as [are] born of English Parents)[)] shall be 
capable to be of the Privy Councill or a Member of either House of 
Parliament or to enjoy any Office or Place of Trust either Civill or Military 
or to have any Grant of Lands Tenements or Hereditaments from the 
Crown to himself or to any other or others in Trust for him[.]64 
Presumably the immediate impetus for this provision was that the Act 
arranged for the Crown to pass (as in fact it did) to the German kings of 
	
 63 Id. (second alteration in original). 
 64 Act of Settlement, supra note 55, at 637.  As a follow-up, to prevent evasion of this requirement, 
Parliament provided that no future naturalization bill could be passed unless it contained a similar 
statement of disqualification.  An act to explain the act made in the twelth year of the reign of King 
William the Third, intituled, An act for further limitation of the crown, and better securing the 
rights and liberties of the subject, 1 Geo. 1 c. 4 (1714) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 13 STATUTES AT LARGE 
141, 142 (Danby Pickering ed., 1764).  The propriety of that provision is dubious, given the ordi-
nary rule that no Parliament could bind a future Parliament.  It was, however, generally respected 
in the eighteenth century.  See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
	
218 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20.2 
Hanover upon the death of Queen Anne,65 and Parliament wished to bar an 
influx of German courtiers into English government.  Parliament may also 
have been influenced by the tendency of William III (a Dutchman) to rely on 
Dutch rather than English advisors, to the considerable annoyance of English 
politicians.  In any event, the Act of Settlement indicated a preference for local 
birth, with a further recognition that birth overseas to English parents was the 
practical equivalent.  It does not bear directly on the meaning of “natural 
born,” however, because (perhaps oddly) the Act did not use the phrase.66 
Thus at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the statutory law and 
common law meaning of “natural born” were, as a practical matter, substan-
tially aligned, with narrow exceptions for people born in particular circum-
stances and particular time periods.  But the 1677 and 1698 Acts were po-
tentially important departures as a theoretical matter, because in them 
Parliament had undertaken its own definition of “natural born” (albeit with 
limited scope).  Eighteenth-century parliaments seized on these precedents 
to make very sweeping changes to the common law definition. 
In 1708, Parliament provided: “[T]he Children of all natural born Subjects 
born out of the Ligeance of Her Majesty Her Heires and Successors shall be 
deemed adjudged and taken to be natural born Subjects of this Kingdom to all 
Intents Constructions and Purposes whatsoever[.]”67  The 1708 Act, although 
to some extent a logical successor to the seventeenth-century legislation, revo-
lutionized the rules of subjectship in several respects.  First, it was open-ended 
temporally, applying indefinitely into the future.  Second, it no longer rested on 
unique historical circumstances, nor could it be justified by a legal fiction of 
direct service to the king when the king was abroad.  The statute was thus a full-
blown re-definition of the common law, not merely a one-time adjustment.   
The 1708 Act also had a key ambiguity.  The seventeenth-century stat-
utes had specifically said that to be covered a child needed only one natural 
	
 65 See Act of Settlement, supra note 55, at 637. 
 66 Interestingly, the Act of Settlement apparently contemplated that some persons who were not nat-
ural born subjects would not be politically disqualified.  Although the 1677 and 1698 Acts had 
made some persons born abroad of English parents natural born subjects, they conspicuously had 
not done so for all such persons. 
 67 An Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 7 Ann. c. 5 (1708) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 9 STATUTES 
OF THE REALM 63 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1822) [hereinafter 1708 Act].  As the title indicates, 
the 1708 Act actually went much further, also declaring that all foreign born Protestants who took 
the oath of allegiance to the English monarch “shall be deemed adjudged and taken to be Her 
Majesties natural born Subjects of this Kingdom to all Intents Constitutions and Purposes as if they 
and every of them had been or were born within this Kingdom.”  Id.  That provision was repealed 
just three years later because of “divers Mischiefs and Inconveniences.” See An Act to repeal the 
Act of the Seventh Year of Her Majesties Reign intituled An Act for naturalizing Foreign 
Protestants (except what relates to the Children of Her Majesties natural born Subjects born out of 
Her Majesties Allegiance), 10 Ann. c. 9 (1711) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 9 STATUTES OF THE REALM 
557 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1822) [hereinafter 1711 Act]. 
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born parent, father or mother.  The 1708 Act, in contrast, could be read to 
require either one natural born parent or two, depending on how one read 
the phrase “Children of all natural born Subjects.”  That led Parliament in 
1731 to pass an act to “explain” the 1708 statute, which provided: 
[A]ll children born out of the ligenace of the crown of England, or of Great 
Britain, or which shall hereafter be born out of such ligeance, whose fathers 
were or shall be natural-born subjects of the crown of England, or of Great 
Britain, at the time of the birth of such children respectively, shall and may, 
by virtue of the said recited clause in the said act of the seventh year of the 
reign of her said late Majesty [i.e., the 1708 Act] and of this present act be 
adjudged and taken to be, and all such children are hereby declared to be 
natural-born subjects of the crown of Great Britain to all intents, constructions 
and purposes whatsoever.68 
Note here that the “explanation” is that one’s father must be a natural 
born subject, a departure from the seventeenth-century statutes and really a 
change from (rather than a clarification of) the 1708 Act.  For present pur-
poses, though, the core point is that the 1731 Act continued the practice of 
declaring a class of foreign-born persons to be not merely subjects but natural 
born subjects, based on the circumstances of their birth. 
Parliament used similar phrasing in a 1773 Act that extended natural-
born subject status to those whose paternal grandfathers were natural-born 
subjects.69  It expressly linked the extension of subjectship to policy consider-
ations arising from expanding foreign commerce, reciting that: 
WHEREAS divers natural-born subjects of Great Britain, who profess and 
exercise the protestant religion, though various lawful causes, especially for the 
better carrying on of commerce, have been, and are, obliged to reside in sev-
eral trading cities, and other foreign places, where they have contracted mar-
riages, and brought up families: and whereas it is equally just and expedient 
that the kingdom should not be deprived of such subjects, nor lose the benefit 
of the wealth that they have acquired; and therefore that not only the children 
of such natural-born subjects, but their children also, should continue under 
the allegiance of his Majesty, and be intitled to come into this kingdom, and 
to bring hither and realize, or otherwise employ, their capital . . . .70 
	
 68 An Act to explain a clause in an act made in the seventh year of the reign of her late majesty Queen 
Anne, For naturalizing foreign protestants, which relates to the children of the natural-born subjects 
of the crown of England, or of Great Britain, 4 Geo. 2 c. 21 (1731) (Gr. Brit.), 16 STATUTES AT 
LARGE 243, 243–44 (Danby Pickering ed., 1765) [hereinafter 1731 Act].  The benefits of the statute 
were expressly denied to those whose parents had been attainted of treason or in the service of a 
foreign prince in enmity to the crown.  Id.  
 69 An Act to extend the provisions of an act, made in the fourth year of the reign of his late majesty 
King George the Second, intituled, An act to explain a clause in an act, made in the seventh year 
of the reign of her late majesty Queen Anne, for naturalizing foreign protestants, which relates to 
the children of the natural-born subjects of the crown of England, or of Great Britain, to the chil-
dren of such children, 13 Geo. 3 c. 21 (1773) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 30 STATUTES AT LARGE 28 
(Danby Pickering ed., 1773) [hereinafter 1773 Act]. 
 70 Id.  
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The Act then provided, following the 1731 Act: 
That all persons born, or who hereafter shall be born, out of the ligeance of 
the crown of England, or of Great Britain, whose fathers were or shall be, by 
virtue of [the 1731 Act] shall and may be adjudged and taken to be, and are 
hereby declared and enacted to be, natural-born subjects of the crown of 
Great Britain, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever, as if he 
and they had been and were born in this kingdom . . . .71 
The founding generation in America was aware of these Acts, if not di-
rectly, via Blackstone, who explained: 
To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by statute 25 Edw. III. 
st. 2. that all children born abroad, provided both their parents were at the 
time of the birth in allegiance to the king . . . might inherit as if born in Eng-
land . . . . But by several more modern statutes these restrictions are still far-
ther taken off: so that all children, born out of the king’s ligeance, whose 
fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, 
to all intents and purposes, without any exceptions; unless their said fathers 
were attained, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; or were then in the 
service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain.72 
Blackstone’s description seems to resolve a possible ambiguity in the stat-
utes, which might be read only to say that foreign born children have the 
rights of natural born subjects, not that they are natural born subjects.  Black-
stone, however, used the phrase “are now natural-born subjects,” indicating 
a change in the definition, not merely an expansion of rights.73   
	
 71 Id.  One might suppose that children covered by the 1773 Act would already be natural born sub-
jects by virtue of the 1731 Act: they were children born abroad whose fathers, though also born 
abroad, were natural born subjects under the 1731 Act (and thus whose children should also have 
been natural born subjects).  However, a 1763 case, Leslie v. Grant, held otherwise.  According to the 
court in Leslie, the 1731 Act only applied to persons whose fathers were natural born subjects under 
the common law, not those whose fathers were natural born subjects by statute.  Leslie v. Grant 
(1763) 2 Paton 68, 77–78 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).  Thus the 1773 Act was a partial overrul-
ing of Leslie (but only partial, as it extended only two generations, not indefinitely).  See infra note 
112 (further discussing Leslie). 
 72 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *361.  This was written before the 1773 Act extended natural born 
status to grandchildren.  Another contemporary account, which may not have been available to the 
Framers, is Richard Wooddeson’s 1777 series of lectures in English law (published in 1792).  Con-
sistent with Blackstone, Wooddeson observed, “An alien by the laws of England, is one born out of 
the ligeance of the king. . . . [I]f natural born subjects have children born abroad, such children also, 
by the [1708 Act], are to be adjudged natural born subjects, and not aliens.”  Richard Wooddeson, 
Vinerian Professor, University of Oxford, Lecture XIV: Of the State of Persons, and First of the State 
of Alienage, Course of Vinerian Lectures at Oxford University (1777), in 1 RICHARD WOODDESON, 
SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370 (1792).  He added: “The issue of an alien, 
born within the realm, are accounted natural subjects . . . .”  Id. at 386. 
 73 A later edition of the Commentaries altered the language slightly to say such persons “are deemed to 
be” natural born subjects.  See Vlahoplus, supra note 3, at 49 n.218 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 44) (detailing the change made to the later edition of the Commentaries to “reflect the author-
ity of the Act of Geo. III”).  It does not appear, however, that this later edition was widely available 
in America prior to 1790.  See Paul Finkelman & David Cobin, Introduction to 1 TUCKER, supra note 
31, at i (indicating that the principal edition of the Commentaries in circulation in America prior to 
1790 was the 1771 Robert Bell American reproduction of Blackstone’s fourth edition; a new edition, 
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Again, Blackstone’s description is consistent with later historical works.  
For example, one leading account declared: 
Persons Born Abroad who are by Statute Natural-born British Subjects.—Some per-
sons born out of the dominions of the King, though aliens by the common law, 
have been made natural-born subjects by statute.  These persons differ from 
those already mentioned, who, though born out of the King’s dominions, are 
natural-born subjects by the common law in that the latter, though born with-
out the dominions, are yet born within the allegiance of the King. . . . 
. . . . 
The result of these statutes [the 1708, 1731, and 1773 Acts] is, that a per-
son, though born abroad, whose father or grandfather on the father’s side was 
born within the British dominions, is a natural-born British subject . . . .74 
Although neither Parliament nor Blackstone provided a full explanation 
for why children born abroad to English subject parents were appropriately 
called “natural born subjects,” the statutory extension seems consistent with 
the principles of the common law.  Under common law, “natural born” 
meant born within the protection of the monarch (and thus, as a natural 
matter, owing allegiance to the person who provided protection).  In ancient 
times, when few people traveled, this understandably meant just those people 
born in the monarch’s territory, since that was typically the extent of the 
monarch’s protection.  But by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as 
foreign travel expanded, the protection of the monarch had to be understood 
more broadly, because English subjects traveling abroad also owed the mon-
arch allegiance and claimed the monarch’s protection.  Thus children of 
English subjects born abroad were born under the allegiance and protection 
of the monarch (what the common law required of a “natural born subject”) 
even though not born in the monarch’s lands.  The statutory expansion of 
natural born subjects thus likely reflected a new recognition that the mon-
arch’s protection and allegiance extended abroad in respect of English sub-
jects and their children. 
As a result of these developments, the traditional common law rule does 
not capture the English legal background in which the Framers operated.  By 
the late eighteenth century, Parliament had claimed power to define natural 
born subjectship substantially beyond what the common law recognized, and 
to extend it—expressly for policy reasons—to broad classes of people born 
outside English territory. 
	
the tenth, was not reprinted in America until 1790).  In any event, the reason for the change is 
unclear, and of uncertain significance. 
 74 HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 66–68; see also A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173 (1896) (“‘Natural-born British subject’ means 
a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.”); id. at 178 (“A is 
born in England.  S, his son, is born at Naples.  S is a natural-born British subject.”).  But see 
Vlahoplus, supra note 3, at 48–54 nn.216–39 (pointing to inconsistent nineteenth-century usage of 
the term “natural-born subjects”). 
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A second related group of English statutes further complicates the matter.  
By these, Parliament purported to extend natural born subject status to cat-
egories of persons based not on the circumstances of their birth but on post-
birth actions.  The first of these, in 1740, applied to persons who served two 
years on English ships during wartime, and stated that any such person  
shall to all intents and purposes be deemed and taken to be a natural born 
subject of his Majesty’s kingdom of Great Britain, and have and enjoy all the 
privileges, powers, rights, and capacities, which such foreign mariner or sea-
man could, should, or ought to have had, and enjoyed, in case he had been 
a natural born subject of his Majesty, and actually a native within the king-
dom of Great Britain.75 
This wording departs from the 1731 Act addressing children born abroad 
and seems to betray some doubt whether Parliament could in fact make the 
beneficiaries actual natural born subjects (as opposed to merely giving the 
rights of natural born subjects).  However, a subsequent statute in the same 
year used language closely tracking the 1731 Act, stating directly that persons 
who lived for seven years in the American colonies “shall be deemed, ad-
judged, and taken to be his Majesty’s natural born subjects of this kingdom, 
to all intents, constructions, and purposes, as if they, and every of them, had 
been or were born within this kingdom . . . .”76  Similar statutes applied to 
persons who served three years on an English whaleboat77 or served as a 
solider in the American regiment.78 
From these statutes one might conclude that Parliament claimed a 
broader power to make anyone a natural born subject regardless of the cir-
cumstances of their birth.  This group of statutes differed in one significant 
respect from the statutes granting natural born status by birth, however.  
	
 75 An act for the better supply of mariners and in his Majesty’s ships of war, and on board and other 
trading ships, and privateers, 13 Geo. 2 c. 3 (1740) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 17 STATUTES AT LARGE 
358, 359 (Danby Pickering ed., 1765) [hereinafter 1740 Supply of Seamen Act]. 
 76 An act for naturalizing such foreign protestants, and others therein mentioned, as are settled, or shall 
settle, in any of his Majesty’s colonies in America, 13 Geo. 2 c. 7 (1740) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 17 
STATUTES AT LARGE 370, 371 (Danby Pickering ed., 1765) [hereinafter 1740 Naturalization Act]. 
 77 An act for the further encouragement and enlargement of the whale fishery, and for continuing 
such laws as are therein mentioned relating thereto; and for the naturalization of such foreign 
protestants, as shall serve for the time therein mentioned, on board such ships as shall be fitted out 
for the said fishery, 22 Geo. 2 c. 45 (1749) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 19 STATUTES AT LARGE 365, 369 
(Danby Pickering ed., 1765) [hereinafter 1749 Act]. 
 78 An act for naturalizing such foreign protestants as have served, or shall serve for the time therein men-
tioned, as officers or soldiers in his Majesty’s royal American regiment, or as engineers in America, 2 
Geo. 3 c. 25  (1761) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 25 STATUTES AT LARGE 162–63 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763) 
[hereinafter 1761 Act]; see also An act to extend the provisions of an act made in the thirteenth year of 
his present Majesty’s reign, intituled, An act for the naturalizing of such foreign protestants, and others 
therein mentioned, as are settled, or shall settle in any of his Majesty’s colonies in America, to other 
foreign protestants who conscientiously scruple the taking of an oath, 20 Geo. 2 c. 44 (1747) (Gr. Brit.), 
reprinted in 19 STATUTES AT LARGE 143 (Danby Pickering ed., 1765) [hereinafter 1747 Act] (modifying 
the loyalty oath required to be sworn to become a subject under these acts). 
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Each of them contained what Blackstone called a “disabling clause,”79 
providing, with immaterial variations: 
That no person who shall become a natural born subject of this kingdom by 
virtue of this act, shall be of the privy council, or a member of either house 
of parliament, or capable of taking, having, or enjoying any office or place 
of trust within the kingdoms of Great Britain or Ireland, either civil or military, 
or of having, accepting, or taking any grant from the crown to himself, or to 
any other in trust for him, of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments within 
the kingdoms of Great Britain or Ireland . . . .80 
This language paralleled the restriction in the Act of Settlement that barred 
persons born outside the dominions from holding office or accepting grants of 
land.81  As discussed, however, the Act of Settlement exempted from this bar 
persons “such as [are] born of English Parents,”82 so the statutes directed to 
children born abroad of English parents did not have this proviso.83 
Thus the statutes relating to post-birth activities did not make their 
beneficiaries full natural born subjects, regardless of what they appeared to 
say.  Instead, Parliament appeared to recognize a key distinction, rooted in 
the Act of Settlement, between those born abroad to English parents (who 
could be given the full status of natural born subject) and those born abroad 
without familial connections to England (who could not).  Significantly, in 
light of the adoption of the phrase “natural born” in the Eligibility Clause, a 
central part of this distinction is that those born abroad to English parents 
	
 79 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *362. 
 80 1740 Naturalization Act, supra note 76, at 373; see also 1740 Supply of Seamen Act, supra note 75, 
at 359 (providing the same, with immaterial differences in language); 1747 Act, supra note 78, at 
145 (providing the same, with immaterial differences in language); 1749 Act, supra note 77, at 370 
(providing the same, with immaterial differences in language); 1761 Act, supra note 78, at 163 
(providing the same, with immaterial differences in language). 
 81 Act of Settlement, supra note 55, at 637.  As noted, a subsequent statute required this language to 
be contained in all naturalization bills.  See supra note 64.  The parallel was not exact, however, as 
the Act of Settlement appeared to apply to all offices and land grants throughout the dominions (or 
at least, it was stated in unlimited language), whereas the subsequent acts referred only to offices 
and land grants within Great Britain and Ireland.  See An act to explain two acts of parliament, one 
of the thirteenth year of the reign of his late Majesty, for naturalizing such foreign protestants, and 
others, as are settled, or shall settle, in any of his Majesty’s colonies in America; and the other of 
the second year of the reign of his present Majesty, for naturalizing such foreign protestants as have 
served, or shall serve, as officers or soldiers in his Majesty’s royal American regiment, or as engi-
neers, in America, 13 Geo 3 c. 25 (1773) (Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 30 STATUTES AT LARGE 30, 31 
(Danby Pickering ed., 1773) (confirming this departure). 
 82 Act of Settlement, supra note 55, at 637 (alteration in original). 
 83 See 1773 Act, supra note 69, at 28–29; 1731 Act, supra note 68, at 243–44; 1708 Act, supra note 67, 
at 63.  As noted, the 1708 Act also gave natural born subject status to all foreign Protestants who 
moved to England and took a loyalty oath; it had no restriction on officeholding or receiving land 
grants, thus creating tension with the Act of Settlement.  See supra note 68.  The portion of the 1708 
Act relating to foreign Protestants was repealed in 1711, and in 1714 Parliament enacted the statute 
calling for all future acts to have the restriction mandated by the Act of Settlement.   
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were eligible to high office while those born abroad without familial 
connections to England were not. 
Notably, Blackstone described the two categories of statutes in different 
terms.  As discussed, he said that those who gained subjectship from birth 
abroad to English fathers “are” natural born subjects.84  He mentioned those 
who gained subjectship from post-birth events (living in the colonies, serving 
on whaleships or in the American regiment) in a separate paragraph two 
pages later in his discussion, and said only that they were “naturalized” as a 
result of their actions.85  As a result, someone reading Blackstone might see 
an even sharper distinction between the two categories than might be 
justified from the statutes themselves. 
But even if we assume that the American Framers had English statutory 
law in mind, it remains somewhat ambiguous what they would have con-
cluded from it.  Would they think that “natural born” meant what it meant 
in English law in 1787–88 (birth within sovereign territory or birth abroad to 
a citizen father or paternal grandfather)?  Or would they have taken it more 
broadly to mean that “natural born” could, at least to a significant extent, be 
defined by statute?  Part IV takes up that question, but before doing so it is 
necessary to consider another possible source of the Framers’ meaning. 
C.  Vattel and the Civil Law Tradition 
English law is not the only possible source of the Framers’ understanding 
of “natural born” citizenship.  Indeed, it is a slightly problematic one.  Eng-
lish law spoke of natural born “subjects” rather than natural born “citizens,” 
and it is possible that the revolutionary-minded Americans perceived a dif-
ference between citizens and subjects for this purpose.86  Moreover, the civil 
law tradition, and especially the influential work of the Swiss international 
law writer Emer de Vattel, supplies another possible definition of the phrase 
expressly linked to “citizens” rather than “subjects.” 
	
 84 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *361. 
 85 Id. at *363 (discussing naturalization by post-birth events).  The later discussion reads,  
[E]very foreign seaman who in time of war serves two years on board an English ship is 
ipso facto naturalized; and all foreign protestants, and Jews, upon their residing seven years 
in any of the American colonies, without being absent above two months at a time, are 
upon taking the oaths naturalized to all intents and purposes, as if they had been born in 
this kingdom; and therefore are admissible to all such privileges, and no other, as 
protestants or Jews born in this kingdom are entitled to. 
  Id. at *363.  
Blackstone may appear to err in saying that the persons described in this paragraph have 
“all” privileges of persons born in the kingdom, but in the previous paragraph he had described the 
“disabling clauses” as applied to such persons.  Id. at *362. 
 86 See Solum, supra note 6, at 28 (making this point and discussing distinctions between citizens and 
subjects made, inter alia, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)). 
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As rendered in the 1760 translation of his work Le Droit des Gens (The Law 
of Nations), Vattel stated: 
[§212] The citizens are the members of the civil society: bound to this society 
by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its 
advantages.  The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country of parents 
who are citizens.  Society not being able to subsist, and perpetuate itself, but 
by the children of citizens; those children naturally follow the condition of 
their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. . . . The country of the fathers is 
then that of the children; and these become true citizens, merely by their 
tacit consent. . . . I say, that in order to be of the country, it is necessary that 
a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for if he is born there of a 
stranger, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.87 
Vattel added that in England, however, “being born in the country natural-
izes the children of a foreigner.”88 
As to those born abroad, Vattel wrote:  
It is asked, whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country, are 
citizens?  The laws have decided this question in several countries, and it is 
necessary to follow their regulations.  By the law of nature alone, children 
follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights (§ 212); the 
place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot of itself fur-
nish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him . . . .89 
Thus Vattel’s view was apparently both broader and narrower than Eng-
lish common law—narrower in disqualifying people born within sovereign 
territory of non-citizen fathers from “natural” citizenship and broader in em-
bracing natural citizenship for those born abroad to citizen fathers.  (English 
statutory law paralleled Vattel on the latter point, but not the former).90 
Although the 1760 translation of Vattel did not link his view of citizenship 
directly with the phrase “natural born,” a 1797 translation did so expressly.  
It followed the 1760 translation on this subject in all material respects except 
that in Section 212 it translated the French word indigenes (which the 1760 
translation had left untranslated) as “natural born citizens.”  Thus the second 
sentence of Vattel’s Section 212 (the passage previously quoted) read in the 
1797 translation: “The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in 
the country, of parents who are citizens.”91  Though this translation 
	
 87 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE: APPLIED 
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS bk. I, ch. XIX, § 212 (London, 
Newbery et al. 1760) (1758).   
 88 Id. § 214. 
 89 Id. § 215. 
 90 It is possible to read Vattel to require both birth in sovereign territory and birth of a citizen father 
to establish “natural born” status.  Read in isolation, that is what § 212 appears to say.  However, 
§ 215 adds that those born abroad to a citizen father have the same status “by the law of nature,” 
which appears to extend the category of those who have citizenship naturally. 
 91 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED 
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, bk. I, ch. XIX, § 212 (Robinson 
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obviously could not have influenced the Framers, it suggests that the transla-
tor (and perhaps people in the wider society) associated Vattel’s “indigenes” 
with the constitutional language of the Eligibility Clause. 
Vattel was no doubt a principal channel for conveying this view of citi-
zenship to America, but he was not an outlier; rather, he reflected the basic 
idea of citizenship by blood, or “jus sanguinis,” in civil law traditions, which 
were likely accessible to at least some of the Framers from other sources.  
Blackstone acknowledged the difference: after declaring that all children of 
aliens born in England were English subjects, he observed that “the consti-
tution of France differs from ours; for there, by their jus albinatus, if a child be 
born of foreign parents, it is an alien.”92 
As a result, Vattel and the civil law tradition offer an alternative definition 
of “natural born” substantially at odds with the modern view.  It would make 
a sizeable category of people not “natural born” even though born in the 
United States, and it would suggest that children born abroad of a citizen 
mother but not a citizen father are not natural born.93  It remains to ask which 
of these meanings—common law, statutory law, or civil law—is most plausi-
bly assigned to the Eligibility Clause.  The next section takes up that question.  
III.  THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP 
This section asks which of the foregoing sources of meaning is best un-
derstood as the original public meaning of the Eligibility Clause.  It is worth 
emphasizing here that the question is not the subjective intent of any partic-
ular Framer, or even the collective subjective intent of all the Framers (even 
assuming that could be identified).  It is, rather, the public meaning of “nat-
ural born Citizen”—what a reasonable informed observer would understand 
by the phrase in the context in which it was used.  In this sense, the legal 
meanings sketched in the preceding subsections are in the nature of 
	
1797) (1758).  In the original French (which was available to the Framers), the key sentence reads: 
“Les naturels ou indigenes font ceux qui font nés dans le pays, de Parens Citoyens.”  See MASKELL, 
supra note 2, at 22 n.100 (discussing the differences in the translations).  
 92 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *362; see also HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 29 (“[T]he law of England 
has always adopted the feudal or territorial principle of determining nationality by the place of birth 
alone, and has always, in theory, at any rate, rejected the contrary principle founded on the Roman 
law and incorporated in the Code Napoleon and the jurisprudence of many modern nations, 
whereby children, wherever born, are always deemed to possess the nationality of their parents, a 
legitimate child taking the nationality of the father and an illegitimate child that of the mother.”). 
 93 To be clear, this reading would not affect the citizenship of persons in these categories.  Congress has 
power to naturalize (that is, to make an alien a citizen) and English practice shows that “naturali-
zation” could be done either individually or categorically.  Moreover, as to persons born in the 
United States, the Fourteenth Amendment appears categorically to declare them citizens at birth.  
The question, germane only to the Eligibility Clause, is whether persons in these categories are 
“natural born” citizens (as opposed to citizens by positive law), and the strong implication of a 
reading based on Vattel is that they are not. 
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dictionary definitions—they do not necessarily represent the views of every-
one, or of any particular person, because people may use words colloquially 
or incorrectly.  Rather they represent (or may represent) a meaning ascribed 
by the culture—in this case the legal culture—in general. 
With this in mind, this section considers the possible candidates.  Although 
each has surface plausibility, this section argues that the best source of mean-
ing in this situation is English law generally, combining common law and stat-
utory law.  As explained below, the alternatives are speculative or implausible. 
A.  The Preference for the English over the Civil Law Definition 
Relying on Vattel, and more generally the civil law tradition, to define 
the Constitution’s phrase “natural born” has some attractions.  To begin, 
Vattel used the word “citizen” (citoyen) rather than “subject.”  English law 
consistently used “subject.”  As the Constitution also used “citizen,” and as 
the revolutionary generation in America surely saw at least in some contexts 
a difference between citizens and subjects,94 Vattel might be thought to have 
a closer connection to the Eligibility Clause’s text and context.  Further, Vat-
tel’s work was well known in founding-era America, both in the original 
French and in several English translations.  Vattel was a principal source of 
the founding generation’s understanding of the law of nations, which the 
United States, as a weak state threatened by powerful European empires, was 
anxious to uphold.95  Thus there are reasons to think the Framers might have 
looked to Vattel in defining natural born citizens. 
The weight of the evidence, however, points strongly in the other direc-
tion.  First, any connection between Vattel and the Eligibility Clause is pure 
speculation.  Apparently no one at the time made the connection, or at least 
there is no surviving record if they did.  To be sure, some individuals might 
have done so.  But it seems clear—as clear as we can be about these mat-
ters—that no widespread public connection was drawn.96 
	
 94 See, e.g., DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE CHARACTER 
AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (1789) (discussing the difference be-
tween citizens and subjects); Solum, supra note 6 (contrasting the term “natural-born subject” in 
English law with the term “natural-born Citizen” in the Constitution). 
 95 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 344–45 (2007) (dis-
cussing the influence of international law writers, especially Vattel, in founding-era America). 
 96 The closest to a founding-era adoption of Vattel’s approach is in David Ramsay’s brief 1789 “dis-
sertation” on citizenship.  Ramsay did not discuss “natural born” citizenship in those words, though 
at one point he wrote, “The citizenship of no man could be previous to the declaration of inde-
pendence, and, as a natural right, belongs to none but those who have been born of citizens since 
the 4th of July, 1776.”  RAMSAY, supra note 94, at 6.  That appears to express a “jus sanguinis” 
approach to citizenship consistent with Vattel.  Elsewhere, though, he wrote that citizenship can be 
acquired by “birth or inheritance.”  Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  This observation seems in tension 
with his claim that citizenship “as a natural right” could only come from one’s parents, because its 
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Second, there is evidence that the founding generation, at least in some 
instances, used “natural born citizen” and “natural born subject” inter-
changeably.  For example, Massachusetts continued the English practice of 
legislative acts naturalizing particular named individuals.  These acts recited 
that the naturalized individuals would have all the rights of (in some cases) 
“natural born subjects” of the state97 and (in others) “natural born citizens.”98  
As far as the historical record reflects, no difference was intended; the phrases 
appear to be used interchangeably to convey the same meaning.  In particu-
lar, the state Acts referred to “natural born subjects” during the Confedera-
tion period immediately before and during the drafting and ratifying process, 
suggesting that revolutionary Americans did not change their terminology 
from citizen to subject in the wake of the Revolution. 
Similarly, Zephaniah Swift’s treatise on Connecticut law, published in 
1795, repeatedly used the phrase “natural born subject” in connection with 
post-independence inhabitants of Connecticut.  Swift began his discussion by 
saying that “[t]he people are considered as aliens, born in some foreign coun-
try, as inhabitants of some neighboring state of the union, or natural born 
subjects, born within the state.”99  Later he added that the children of aliens, 
“born in this state, are considered as natural born subjects, and have the 
same rights with the rest of the citizens.”100  As a result, there is little reason, 
on this ground, to think Vattel is a better source of the clause’s meaning than 
English law: Americans did not broadly reject the word “subject” and instead 
used it interchangeably with “citizen.” 
Third, post-ratification evidence indicates that the Framers were using 
an English-law influenced definition of citizenship, not a Vattel-influenced 
definition.  As described above, an early post-ratification discussion of citi-
zenship was Madison’s comment in the Smith controversy (in which there 
	
disjunctive suggests that one could acquire citizenship (though perhaps not citizenship “as a natural 
right”) by birth alone.  In any event, to the extent Ramsay took a Vattelian view he appears to be 
an outlier, and he did not refer to Vattel by name. 
 97 E.g., 1786 Mass. Acts 241–42; 1787 Mass. Acts 579–80, 630; 1788 Mass. Acts 25, 105–06; 1789 
Mass. Acts 405–06, 509–10; 1790 Mass. Acts 85–86 (naming individual naturalized persons “in-
titled to all the liberties, priviledges and immunities of natural born subjects”); see also 1782 Mass. 
Acts 9–10 (referring to privileges of “natural Subjects”). 
 98 E.g., 1784 Mass. Acts 124–25; 1785 Mass. Acts 507–08; 1786 Mass. Acts 53–54; 1787 Mass. Acts 
571–72; 1788 Mass. Acts 38–39 (naming individual naturalized persons entitled “to all the liberties, 
privileges & immunities of natural born Citizens”). 
 99 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 163 (1795). 
 100 Id. at 167; see also id. at 163 (referring to the “subject of the state”); id. at 165 (noting that a naturalized 
foreigner owes the same allegiance as a “natural born subject”); id. at 166 (noting that foreigners 
enjoy the same “justice and law” as “subjects of this state”); id. at 167 (noting that children of 
ambassadors born abroad are considered “natural born subjects”).  Notably, Swift also sometimes 
used “citizen” to mean the same as “subject.”  See, e.g., id. at 165 (noting that “[a]ll citizens of any 
of the individual states at the time of the adoption of the constitution, became citizens of the United 
States . . . .”). 
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was some question whether Representative Smith was a citizen and thus eli-
gible to Congress).  Madison wrote, “It is an established maxim that birth is 
a criterion of allegiance.  Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from 
place, and sometimes from parentage; but, in general, place is the most cer-
tain criterion; it is what applies in the United States . . . .”101 
As discussed, this quote is ambiguous on the scope of citizenship rights 
(and does not use the phrase “natural born” at all).  But it strongly indicates 
that Madison employed an English rather than a Vattelian definition.  In 
referring to birth citizenship deriving “sometimes from place, and sometimes 
from parentage” he described the divide between English law “jus soli” and 
civil law “jus sanguinis.”  He then said “place is the most certain criterion” 
and “what applies in the United States.”102  “Place” is the rule of English law; 
it is manifestly not Vattel’s rule, because Vattel excluded from birth citizen-
ship the fairly large class of persons whose fathers were not citizens.  Thus 
Madison apparently thought that the English rules were the U.S. baseline. 
Swift’s treatise on Connecticut law, mentioned above, even more clearly 
adopts English law.  Swift directly tied the status of “subject” to birth in sov-
ereign territory, describing “natural born subjects” as those “born within the 
state” and later specifically saying that the children of aliens “born in this 
state” are natural born subjects.103  Swift also included an explanation of the 
rule, based on the idea of allegiance to the territorial sovereign at birth in 
return for protection, that closely tracked Blackstone.104  Like Madison’s as-
sessment, Swift’s description accords with English law and is flatly incon-
sistent with Vattel.105 
St. George Tucker’s 1803 treatise also followed this pattern, observing:  
Prior to the adoption of the constitution, the people inhabiting the different 
states might be divided into two classes: natural born citizens, or those born 
within the state, and aliens, or such as were born out of it.  The first, by their 
birth-right, became entitled to all the privileges of citizens; the second, were 
entitled to none, but such as were held out and given by the laws of the re-
spective states prior to their emigration.106 
Again, equating “natural born” and “born within the state” contradicts Vat-
tel and adopts the English approach.107   
	
 101 1 ANNALS, supra 35, at 404; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 102 1 ANNALS, supra 35, at 404.  
 103 SWIFT, supra note 99, at 163, 167. 
 104 Id. at 165. 
 105 Swift went so far as to say that “It is an established maxim, received by all political writers, that every 
person owes a natural allegiance to the government of that country in which he is born.”  Id. at 163.  
That, of course, was not true; Vattel and continental writers said the contrary.  See supra Part II.C. 
 106 1 TUCKER, supra note 31, app. at 256 (quoting a letter from George Nicholas). 
 107 Later constitutional treatises adopted a similar view.  See 1 KENT, supra note 33, at 255  (describing 
the effect of the Eligibility Clause to be that “the president is required to be a native citizen”); 2 
KENT, supra note 33, at 33 (defining “Natives” to mean “all persons born within the jurisdiction of 
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In sum, most American commentators and jurists who discussed citizen-
ship in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries followed the Eng-
lish approach in assuming that as a general rule birth in the United States 
was sufficient to convey citizenship.108  That assumption shows that they did 
not think Vattel’s view had been adopted in the United States, because Vattel 
directly declared that a person born in a country was not a citizen of that 
country unless his father was also a citizen of that country.  Particularly in 
the context of a country with high immigration, as the United States was at 
the time, it would be impossible to follow Vattel’s view without substantial 
difficulties: large numbers of people moved to the United States and then 
had children; the children were assumed to be U.S. citizens but (absent sub-
sequent naturalization) would not be under Vattel’s rule.  Thus, following 
Vattel would have created a large (and self-sustaining) class of U.S. residents 
who were not U.S. citizens despite birth in the United States and with no 
material connections to any other country.  There is no evidence that any 
substantial number of people in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
thought U.S. law worked this way. 
While it is true that this evidence is not comprehensive, it nonetheless 
indicates that in the post-ratification period Americans tended to adopt the 
English approach to subjectship/citizenship, not Vattel’s approach.  In any 
event, it outweighs evidence to the contrary, which apart from speculation is 
essentially non-existent.  
B.  Common Law or Statutory Law? 
Once we conclude that founding-era Americans looked to English legal 
conceptions and definitions in thinking about citizenship, we face a more dif-
ficult question: did the Eligibility Clause adopt the common law meaning, or 
the common law meaning as modified by statute?  As described above, this 
is a crucial question: English common law, with very minor exceptions, em-
braced an absolute territorial conception of subjectship at birth, such that (in 
	
the United States.”); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 80–81 (1825) (“Therefore every person born within the United States, its territories 
or districts, whether the parents are citizens or aliens, is a natural born citizen in the sense of the 
constitution . . . . Under our constitution the question is settled by its express language, and when 
we are informed that, excepting those who were citizens, (however the capacity was acquired,) at 
the time the constitution was adopted, no person is eligible to the office of president unless he is a 
natural born citizen, the principle that the place of birth creates the relative quality is established as 
to us.”).  Joseph Story wrote to similar effect.  See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 
(3 Pet.) 99, 122 (1830) (describing citizenship principally in terms of place of birth); id. at 155 (Story, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (taking a similar view). 
 108 Some debate persisted as to the question of persons born to parents who were only visiting the 
United States temporarily.  See, e.g., Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 584–88 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) 
(reflecting debate over citizenship of persons born of parents only temporarily in the country).   
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general) children born abroad of subject parents were not natural born sub-
jects;109 in contrast, by statute the class of natural born subjects had been 
extended at various times to various persons, and after 1773 the rule was that 
children born abroad with English subject fathers or paternal grandfathers 
were “natural born” English subjects.110 
Like the argument for looking to Vattel, the argument for looking only to 
the common law definition has some textual plausibility.  In particular, the 
text’s use of the word “natural” implies a non-statutory definition, owing to 
the distinction between natural law and positive (statutory) law.  Because 
English common law, at least with regard to subjectship, regarded itself as 
founded on natural law, the Constitution’s use of “natural” might be thought 
of as an express incorporation of common law.  Further, unlike in the case of 
Vattel’s definition, post-ratification sources suggest that Americans were in-
fluenced by the natural law of subjectship/citizenship.  All of the sources dis-
cussed above—Madison, Swift, Tucker, Rawle, Kent, and Story—empha-
sized the common law distinction between birth in sovereign territory and 
birth outside sovereign territory.111  None of them expressly acknowledged 
that persons born abroad to U.S. citizens (other than diplomats) could be 
natural born U.S. citizens, and several of them spoke in categorical terms 
that seem to exclude the possibility. 
Here, however, it is important to reemphasize that the question is the 
meaning of “natural born” in the Eligibility Clause.  We look to English law 
because that phrase had an established meaning in English law, which is the 
best indication of its public meaning in the United States in 1787–88.  Put 
this way, it seems odd to look at only a portion of English law (common law) 
rather than the whole body of English law. 
The simple fact is that the pure common law definition of “natural born” 
was not the law in England in the 1780s, and had not been for over a century.  
A quick glance at Blackstone would suffice to show founding-era Americans 
that Parliament had altered the definition on numerous occasions.  Im-
portantly, it was not the case that Parliament had merely said certain persons 
born outside English territory were subjects despite the common law; Parlia-
ment had said that such persons would be called “natural born” subjects de-
spite the common law.  That is, the statutes expressly changed the definition 
(and again, this was apparent in Blackstone as well as in the statutes them-
selves).112  In sum, the late-eighteenth-century definition of “natural born” 
	
 109 See supra Part II.A. 
 110 See supra Part II.B. 
 111 See supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
 112 See supra Part II.B.  But see Vlahoplus, supra note 3, at 52 (arguing to the contrary that the English 
statutes did not change the definition but only gave the rights of natural born subjects to those who 
were not); see also id. at 48–54 nn.216–39.  Vlahoplus’s argument principally rests on the language 
	
232 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20.2 
was a combination of common law and statutory law—and anyone even 
mildly familiar with English law would have understood it this way.  If we 
are using the meaning of terms in English law as a sort of dictionary definition 
of legal terms of art in the Constitution, it makes little sense to use anything 
but the then-existing legal meanings, rather than an artificial subset.  
Moreover, as discussed, the Constitution’s Framers were undoubtedly fa-
miliar with the English practice of defining “natural born” subjects by stat-
ute, especially through Blackstone’s prominent description of it.113  If the 
Framers wanted to limit presidential eligibility only to persons born within 
the nation’s territory, it is highly unlikely that they would have used a 
phrase—“natural born”—that they knew English law defined to include 
some people born outside the nation’s territory.  Had they intended it, they 
could easily have limited eligibility to those “born in the United States” in-
stead of using a term with more flexible meaning.114  If there were evidence 
that the Framers used a different definition linked only to territory, or that 
they misunderstood English law, it would be another matter—but as re-
counted above there is no such evidence.  And further, limiting the Eligibility 
Clause to the common law meaning would make the 1790 Act unconstitu-
tional, as also explained above.115   
	
of the statutes themselves, which he reads as stopping short of a full change to the definition, and 
the court decision in Leslie v. Grant, discussed supra note 71, along with post-ratification English cases 
and commentary.  This argument seems unpersuasive, however.  First, the statutory language ap-
pears on its face to declare status.  As recounted above, the 1731 Act (the most significant one in 
force at the time of the founding) said that persons born abroad of English fathers “are hereby 
declared to be natural-born subjects.”  1731 Act, supra note 68; see also 1773 Act, supra note 69 
(persons born abroad whose fathers were naturalized by the 1731 Act “are hereby declared and 
enacted to be, natural-born subjects”).  Further, as also discussed above, Blackstone appeared to 
read the relevant statutes as declaratory.  See supra text accompanying notes 72–73 (persons born 
abroad and covered by the relevant statutes “are now natural born subjects”).  Vlahoplus’ strongest 
support comes from the Leslie case, which found the statutory grant of natural born subjectship did 
not extend to a second generation (that is, children born abroad whose fathers were natural born 
subjects under the 1731 Act were not themselves natural born subjects).  However, the judges in 
Leslie did not make general conclusions about the effect of the naturalization statutes; their common 
conclusion was only that Parliament did not intend to extend natural-born subjectship to the second 
generation born abroad—a conclusion they reached substantially for instrumental reasons. 
 113 See supra Part II.B.  In particular, John Jay, who is thought to have prompted the use of the phrase 
in the Eligibility Clause, was an Anglophile lawyer, diplomat and U.S. Foreign Secretary who had 
considerable dealings with England; he would seem likely to have had a full understanding of Eng-
lish law and practice. 
 114 One could argue that the Framers should have used “born in the United States or born abroad to 
U.S. parents” if that is what they intended.  But that language would not have been satisfactory.  In 
English practice, and in post-ratification U.S. practice, there have always been limits on the ability 
to gain natural born status from one’s parents, including residency, fathers versus mothers, loyalty 
oaths, etc.  Attempting to resolve and spell out all of these limitations would have been unduly 
burdensome; thus, a flexible term that left the details to Congress was a better choice. 
 115 See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
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The post-ratification commentary is not to the contrary.  Most of it did not 
directly address the question.  Even with the statutory modifications, eight-
eenth-century English law generally followed the traditional common law def-
inition of “natural born” as meaning territorial birth.  Thus, it is unsurprising 
that commentators, speaking generally, used what appears to be the common 
law definition.  Most of them did not confront the question whether “natural 
born” could encompass statutorily defined birth abroad; several commentators 
could be read to suggest that it might, and one commentator who did address 
the question directly, James Bayard, expressly said that children born abroad 
of U.S. citizen parents were natural born citizens.116 
Further, the Constitution’s Framers were familiar with the idea of statu-
torily defined birth-right citizenship from their own experiences.  As early as 
1779, Virginia passed a citizenship statute, “An act declaring who shall be 
deemed citizens of this commonwealth.”117  By that act,  
all white persons born within the territory of this commonwealth, and all 
who have resided therein two years next before the passing of this act; and 
all who shall hereafter migrate into the same, other than alien enemies, and 
shall before any court of record, give satisfactory proof by their own oath or 
affirmation that they intend to reside therein; and moreover shall give assur-
ance of fidelity to the commonwealth; and all infants wheresoever born, 
whose father if living, or otherwise whose mother was a citizen at the time of 
their birth . . . shall be deemed citizens of this commonwealth . . . .118 
This provision was modified somewhat in a new act in 1783 that declared 
among other things that “all free persons, born within the territory of this 
commonwealth . . . and also all children wheresoever born, whose fathers or 
	
 116 Bayard, in his 1833 treatise on the Constitution, observed in connection with his discussion of the 
Eligibility Clause:  
It is not necessary that a man should be born in this country, to be ‘a natural born citizen.’  
It is only requisite he should be a citizen by birth, and that is the case with all the children 
of citizens who have ever resided in this country, though born in a foreign country. 
  BAYARD, supra note 33, at 96.  It is not clear, however, what basis Bayard had for this conclusion 
(and he pointed to no authority for it).   
Of the other major commentators, Kent discussed the English statutes extending “natural 
born” status to children born abroad but did not say how those rules translated to U.S. law.  2 
KENT, supra note 33, at 43–46.  He then discussed U.S. statutes relating to naturalization without 
explaining the phrase “natural born.” Id. at 56–57.  Rawle declared that all persons born in the 
United States are natural born citizens under the Eligibility Clause, but did not say anything about 
those born outside the United States.  RAWLE, supra note 107, at 80–81.  Tucker appeared to speak 
categorically of natural born citizens born within sovereign territory and others born outside it; 
however, he did not say anything specifically about children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents. 1 
TUCKER, supra note 31, app. at 256. 
 117 An act declaring who shall be deemed citizens of this commonwealth, Act of May 3, 1779, ch. 55, 
reprinted in 10 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF 
ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 
1619, at 129 (1822). 
 118 Id. 
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mothers are or were citizens at the time of the birth of such children, shall be 
deemed citizens of this commonwealth . . . .”119 
The Virginia statutes did not use the phrase “natural born,” but they rec-
ognized citizenship at birth both in the sense of English common law (birth 
in the territory, without restriction as to the parents’ citizenship) and citizen-
ship at birth by statutory extension to those born abroad to citizen parents.  
Although there is no direct evidence that Virginians regarded the latter cat-
egory as “natural born,” the Virginia statutes paralleled the English citizen-
ship statutes, and under the English statutes the foreign-born subjects-at-
birth were called “natural born.”  It would have been odd for Virginians to 
develop a different definition. 
In sum, the best view is that “natural born” in the Eligibility Clause meant 
what it meant in contemporaneous English law, taken as a whole.  That raises 
this project’s most difficult question: what did it mean?  Did it mean precisely 
the contours of “natural born” as defined by common law and statute in 
1787–88?  Or did it mean more broadly the common law definition as mod-
ified from time to time by statute?120  In considering this question, it becomes 
essential to consider the role of Congress’s naturalization power. 
IV.  THE NATURALIZATION CLAUSE AND CONGRESS’S “NATURAL 
BORN” POWER 
A.  Congress’s Power to Define “Natural Born” 
To restate, this Article has concluded so far that (i) the phrase “natural 
born” in the Eligibility Clause can be defined by looking to that phrase’s 
meaning in contemporaneous English law, and (ii) English law, in this con-
text, should be understood as English law generally, including both common 
law and statutory law. 
One might suppose, then, that this assessment would yield a decisive re-
sult.  English law in 1787–88 was clear.  “Natural born” status included per-
sons who were born subjects under common law—meaning essentially all 
persons born within sovereign territory (except children of foreign sovereigns, 
diplomats and invading soldiers) plus a small category of persons born abroad 
(children of English monarchs and diplomats).  Full “natural born” status also 
	
 119 An act for the admission of emigrants and declaring their right to citizenship, Act of Oct. 8, 1783, 
ch. 16, reprinted in 11 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, 
IN THE YEAR 1619, at 322–323 (1823). 
 120 As noted, the Clement & Katyal essay wholly elides this question by (incorrectly) describing eight-
eenth-century English statutory law as providing natural-born subject status to all “children born 
outside of the British Empire to subjects of the Crown.”  Clement & Katyal, supra note 2, at 161–62. 
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included a category of persons who were declared to be born subjects by 
statute, namely those born abroad with English fathers or paternal grandfa-
thers.  It did not extend any further.121  Translated to U.S. terms in the Eli-
gibility Clause, this would seem to mean that only persons meeting this de-
scription would be eligible to the presidency—most notably, in terms of 
modern law, excluding those born abroad with only citizen mothers. 
This view, however, misunderstands the nature of Parliament’s power over 
naturalization, and correspondingly misunderstands Congress’s power under 
the Naturalization Clause.  The lesson of developments in eighteenth-century 
English statutory law in this area was that “natural born” was not a fixed con-
cept, but rather was amenable to parliamentary modification, at least at the 
margins.  The history of Parliament’s role in the definition showed that Parlia-
ment made frequent adjustments, in both directions.  Parliament began with 
statutory adjustments for birth abroad that were very precise in time and cat-
egory, but which allowed either a father or a mother who was a subject to be 
sufficient.  The 1708 Act appeared to open the definition of “natural born” to 
anyone born abroad of an English parent, and indeed to any foreign 
protestant, but the latter provision was repealed after only three years, and the 
1731 Act cut it back further to only those foreign-born persons with an English 
father; the 1773 Act then extended “natural born” to those with an English 
paternal grandfather.122  In short, there was no longstanding statutory defini-
tion.  The definition was subject to continual parliamentary adjustment.  Or, 
put another way, the definition was what Parliament said from time to time. 
Moreover, it is clear that Parliament was not merely codifying a pre-ex-
isting common law, or even attempting to implement its own conclusions 
about natural law.  Rather, the eighteenth-century extensions (and cutbacks) 
were instrumental, explained in terms of the nation’s desire to promote over-
seas trade and travel, to expand its wealth, and to lure productive citizens to 
its territory.  Well before 1787–88, therefore, the English understanding of 
“natural born” had lost its traditional connection with natural law and natu-
ral allegiance; it was a status Parliament could convey based on the circum-
stances of birth.  It had, in other words, become something of a redundancy: 
“natural” no longer carried independent meaning within the phrase.  A nat-
ural born subject was simply someone born a subject, by the operation of 
common law or statutory law. Or, put another way, the 1787–88 English law 
meaning of “natural born” was the common law definition as modified from 
time to time by statute.   
	
 121 As discussed, additional categories of people—persons living in the American colonies, and persons 
serving on English ships during wartime, on English whaleboats, or in the American regiment—
had some but not all of the rights of natural born subjects. 
 122 See supra Part II.B. 
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As a result, it is important that the U.S. Constitution gave Congress 
“Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”123  The most 
obvious marker for the scope of this power is Parliament’s power of natural-
ization.  In modern American discourse, “naturalization” is often understood 
as the power to extend U.S. citizenship to foreign citizens on an individual-
ized basis.  That, however, is not a full description of the power as understood 
in the eighteenth century.  In addition to individualized grants of subjectship, 
“naturalization” in English law referred to statutes that declared categories 
of persons to be English subjects.124  That is, “naturalization” meant a pro-
cess that made someone a subject who was not a subject under common law.  
This is indeed the origin of the word: a person who was a subject under com-
mon law was a “natural” subject; a person made a subject by statute was 
made to be as if they were a natural subject—hence, naturalized. 
Crucially, all of the eighteenth-century statutes that declared a class of 
persons to be “natural born” subjects were called acts of naturalization.125  
As a result, there is no doubt that Parliament’s power of naturalization in-
cluded the power to declare categories of natural born subjects beyond the 
traditional common law.  Somewhat confusingly, in terms of modern usage, 
these persons were both “natural born” and “naturalized.” 
Applied to the U.S. Constitution, the implication of the English law ter-
minology is clear.  Congress’s power of “Naturalization,” like Parliament’s 
power, includes both the power to establish rules for naturalizing foreign cit-
izens on an individualized basis and the power to declare categories of per-
sons citizens by the circumstances of their birth.  And the latter power in-
cludes the power to define certain categories as “natural born” (a phrase that 
in eighteenth-century English law had little practical effect, but which took 
on new significance in U.S. law as a result of the Eligibility Clause). 
This perspective helps resolve a textual puzzle of the Eligibility Clause: 
why the drafters used the phrase “natural born.”  Presumably they knew that 
it had a somewhat ambiguous definition—this would be apparent from a 
quick read of Blackstone and Vattel, who defined it differently.  If they meant 
“persons born in the United States” it would have been much easier to simply 
say so.  A plausible explanation is that they deliberately picked a phrase that 
they knew (from English practice) had some flexibility for statutory definition, 
but would still protect against the particular threats they were trying to 
avoid.126  If they thought it important for the President to have some life-long 
	
 123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 124 See HENRIQUES, supra note 49, at 34–41 (discussing both powers of naturalization). 
 125 See supra Part II.B. 
 126 An alternative explanation might be that (assuming one credits the theory that the language origi-
nated with Jay) Jay did not want to limit eligibility to persons born in the United States as several 
of his children were born abroad.  But, since they were born while he was serving as a diplomatic 
	
Dec. 2017] ORIGINAL MEANING OF “NATURAL BORN” 237 
connection to the United States but also thought this could be established in 
some circumstances for those born abroad, using a phrase somewhat open to 
legislative definition would serve them well. 
B.  The 1790 Naturalization Act Revisited 
The foregoing observations also help explain the 1790 Naturalization 
Act, which declared that children born abroad of U.S. citizen parents were 
“natural born” citizens, provided the child’s father met a specific residency 
requirement.127  The First Congress apparently believed it had power to de-
clare this category of persons to be “natural born,” even though the category 
Congress chose did not precisely parallel existing English law and the Con-
stitution did not expressly provide Congress with power to make such a dec-
laration.  Considering the English background, one can nonetheless see why 
Congress understood itself to have this power. 
The first notable feature of the 1790 Act is that Congress created its own 
definition of natural born citizen.  The 1790 Act’s definition did not exactly 
track any of the English or continental definitions of “natural born”: under 
English common law persons born abroad were not considered “natural 
born”;128 under English statutory law as explained by Blackstone129 and under 
Vattel’s law-of-nations theory130 they were “natural born” if but only if their 
fathers were natural born citizens.131  Thus Congress did not seem to be adopt-
ing any existing definition, but rather reaching its own conclusions about the 
appropriate definition.  In this sense, it was acting consistently with Black-
stone’s suggestion of “natural born” as being open to statutory definition (even 
though Congress did not adopt the exact definition of English statutory law).132   
The 1790 Act is hard to explain on any other theory (aside from the claim 
that Congress acted unconstitutionally).133 
	
agent of the United States, they would have been considered natural born citizens even under the 
traditional common law definition of “natural born.” 
 127 1790 Act, supra note 36. 
 128 See supra Part II.A. 
 129 See supra Part II.B; see also Ramsey, supra note 37. 
 130 See supra Part II.C. 
 131 As noted, the 1790 Act is ambiguous as to whether it meant both parents or only one parent had to 
be a U.S. citizen, but in either event it was not precisely parallel with English law or law-of-nations 
theory.  See Ramsey, supra note 37 (favoring the broader view of the statute but noting in any event 
that the 1790 Act did not parallel the English definition). 
 132 Congress’s definition resembled Virginia’s citizenship statute, which gave birth citizenship to any-
one born abroad with at least one citizen parent, although Virginia did not use the phrase “natural 
born.”  See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
 133 To be sure, the First Congress did pass some unconstitutional provisions.  But in this case, where 
the constitutional language is ambiguous on its face, the First Congress’s actions seem relevant ev-
idence of the proper interpretation. 
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A second concern is that the “natural born” portion of the 1790 Act is 
not easily understood as the exercise of any constitutionally delegated power 
apart from the naturalization power.  It is extremely likely that Congress saw 
the naturalization power as its source, as the Act was titled an act “to establish 
an uniform Rule of Naturalization” (exactly tracking the constitutional lan-
guage), and the provisions on natural birth appear after a series of provisions 
describing how foreign citizens may become U.S. citizens (the more common 
understanding of “naturalization”).134  Moreover, Congress declared foreign-
born children of U.S. citizens not merely to be U.S. citizens, but to be natural 
born U.S. citizens.135  Congress thus must have believed the naturalization 
power extended to declarations of “natural born” status.  
Without a full understanding of English statutory practice, these conclu-
sions might seem odd, but in light of Parliament’s naturalization acts they 
make perfect sense.  The 1790 Congress evidently understood that Parlia-
ment’s naturalization power (and thus its own naturalization power) included 
the power to declare categories of persons to be natural born citizens. 
The legislative history of the 1790 Act, though sparse, appears to confirm 
this interpretation.  Initially the proposed bill did not address foreign-born 
children of U.S. citizens, providing only for the naturalization of adult aliens 
and their children.  At one point Congressman Burke stated: “The case of 
the children of American parents born abroad ought to be provided for, as 
was done in the case of English parents, in the 12th year of William III.”136  
The statutory reference is apparently to the Act of Settlement, based on the 
citation, although Burke likely had the slightly earlier 1698 naturalization 
statute in mind.137  Later Congressman Hartley said he “had another clause 
	
 134 1790 Act, supra note 36. 
 135 Id.  An objection might be that the statute’s language is arguably less emphatic than the English 
statutes, saying only that such persons should be “considered as” natural born citizens, not that they 
“are” natural born citizens.  See John Vlahoplus, On the Meaning of “Considered as Natural Born,” WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2017), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2017/04/on-the-
meaning-of-considered-as-natural-born/.  However, the 1790 Act also said, using parallel lan-
guage, that persons who go through the statutory naturalization process as adults shall be “consid-
ered as” citizens.  Plainly this meant that they “are” citizens, not merely that they have the rights 
of citizens.  Accordingly, it is hard to see why the clause relating to foreign-born children should be 
read differently.  Moreover, it appears likely that Congress was specifically drafting with the Eligi-
bility Clause in mind.  There seems no other explanation for the decision to direct one group to be 
“considered as citizens” and the other to be “considered as natural born citizens”; the only differ-
ence in rights under the Constitution or applicable law was the Eligibility Clause. 
 136 1 ANNALS, supra note 35, at 1121.   
 137 See supra Part II.B.  It is likely Burke misspoke as to the date of the English statute.  As discussed, 
supra Part II.B, the Act of Settlement was passed in the twelfth year of William III to (among other 
things) restrict office holding to English subjects born in the realm or born of English subjects 
abroad, but it did not provide any affirmative rights to children born abroad.  Burke was more 
likely thinking of the statute of the ninth year of King William (1698), which recognized natural 
born subject status for children born to English subjects abroad.  See 1698 Act, supra note 61.  It is 
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ready” for this matter, which was presumably included in a subsequent re-
draft as the basis of what became the finally enacted language.138  David Cur-
rie, in his history of Congress’s discussion of the Constitution, mentions the 
1790 Act briefly, observing that “[i]n accepting [Burke’s] suggestion, Con-
gress appears to have interpreted the authority to enact ‘naturalization’ laws 
to give it a general power to define or confer citizenship.”139 
This history supports several conclusions.  First, Congress saw foreign-
born children of U.S. citizens as categorically different from other aliens 
wishing to become U.S. citizens.  Second, the basis for this categorical dis-
tinction was the English statutory regime that gave natural born subject sta-
tus to children of English subjects born abroad, as Burke’s comment indi-
cated.  That in turn confirms that Congress linked its power to declare 
natural born citizenship with the English Parliament’s actions regarding chil-
dren born abroad and that it linked the phrase “natural born citizen” (which 
Congress surely knew was part of the Eligibility Clause) with the English idea 
of natural born subjects (including the idea that foreign-born children with 
English parents could be “natural born”).  Third, Congress did not think it 
was limited to the exact English law definition of natural born, as it then 
existed; rather Congress thought its naturalization power included power to 
formulate its own version of natural born.140 
	
unclear why Burke focused on the earlier statute rather than the mid-eighteenth-century English 
statutes relating to natural born subjects that were then in force. 
 138 1 ANNALS, supra note 35, at 1125.  The new proposal prompted some debate as to its extent, prin-
cipally focused on two points.  First, there was a question whether the new language encompassed 
children of U.S. citizen mothers and alien fathers.  Compare Cornell, supra note 37 (reading the de-
bate to suggest that it did not), with Ramsey, supra note 37 (reading the debate to suggest that it did); 
see also Clement & Katyal, supra note 2 (assuming without explanation that it did).  Second, there 
was a question whether the citizenship right would extend too far into future generations lacking 
connection with the United States; this concern resulted in the addition of the residency require-
ment at the end of the clause. 
 139 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801, at 
89–90 (1997).  For further discussion, see Ramsey, supra note 37. 
 140 Two objections to this reading may be considered.  First, Saul Cornell argues that St. George 
Tucker in his 1803 commentaries read the 1790 Act not to give presidential eligibility for children 
of U.S. citizens born abroad.  See Cornell, supra note 37, at 99 (discussing 2 TUCKER, supra note 31, 
at 374–75 n.12).  As discussed elsewhere, however, Tucker appeared here to be addressing persons 
naturalized under the first paragraph of the 1790 Act, not those declared natural born citizens.  See 
Ramsey, supra note 37, at 157.  Second, of greater weight, Congress replaced the 1790 Act with a 
new naturalization statute in 1795 that dropped the “natural born” language.  See supra notes 39–
40 and accompanying text.  This action could be read as disclaiming a congressional power to 
declare natural born citizen status.  However, as noted, nothing in the surrounding circumstances 
suggests this was Congress’s intent, and the significance of the shift in language remains uncertain.  
See CURRIE, supra note 139, at 194–95 (discussing debates over 1795 Act without mentioning the 
treatment of children of U.S. citizens born abroad). 
Some scholars have found a comment by James Madison during the drafting of the 1795 Act 
to be suggestive.  See McManahon, Natural Born Citizen Clause, supra note 3; Elhauge, supra note 3.  
At one point the House considered whether to bar former U.S. citizens who had renounced their 
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In sum, then, the key to the Eligibility Clause is not just its own language, 
but Congress’s Article I, Section 8 power over naturalization.  In English law 
the naturalization power included the power to define who was “natural born.”  
Absent indications to the contrary, Congress’s naturalization power should 
have the same scope—a point confirmed by the 1790 Naturalization Act.   
C.  Limits on Congress’s Power to Define “Natural Born” 
While the Constitution thus apparently granted Congress power to define 
natural birth, we should also consider possible limits on that power.  The Con-
stitution’s Framers might have conveyed an unlimited power on Congress, but 
that seems unlikely.  In particular, it is not clear that Congress’s possession of 
an unlimited power would resolve the problems of foreign intrigue.  If a person 
born and raised a foreigner could be made eligible for the presidency simply 
by having enough supporters in Congress to redefine his status, that would 
seem to heighten rather than ameliorate the problem of foreign intrigue.141 
Ordinary language and English practice suggest at least two important 
limits on Congress’s power, however.  First, it is doubtful that Congress could 
convey natural born status on persons with no connections to the United 
States at birth.  To begin, it simply does too much violence to the constitu-
tional language to say that a person whose citizenship arises solely from events 
after birth is a “natural born” citizen.  Whatever the interactions between 
“natural” and “born,” there seems no way to plausibly say that a person 
	
citizenship from regaining U.S. citizenship through naturalization.  Madison observed that he “did 
not think Congress, by the Constitution, had any authority to readmit American citizens at all.  It 
was granted to them to admit aliens.”  4 ANNALS, supra note 40, at 1027.  However, this comment 
provides little guidance.  As both the context of the surrounding debate and Madison’s language 
itself make clear, it came in the unrelated context of readmission of former citizens.  See CURRIE, 
supra note 139, at 195 n.173 (discussing Madison’s comment in these terms).  It had nothing to do 
with Congress’s power to extend “natural born” status to children born abroad, a topic which was 
not being discussed at the time.  Plainly Madison thought, at minimum, that Congress could grant 
citizenship at birth to the children of U.S. citizens (the final bill did so, and Madison supported it).  
Further, Madison did not explain the basis of his belief, so there is no way to determine whether he 
might also have perceived other limits on Congress’s naturalization power.  And in any event his 
reading of the Constitution on this point seems wrong: a former U.S. citizen, having become an 
alien, would seem eligible for naturalization to the same extent as any other alien.  But see id. (sug-
gesting that Madison may have believed that U.S. citizens could not expatriate themselves).  The 
final bill did not contain any limit on naturalization in this regard.   
It is true, as some scholars point out, that Madison served on the House committee that 
drafted the bill; the failure to carry over the “natural born” language from the 1790 Act was pre-
sumably the work of that committee, as no other source is reflected in the Annals.  See 4 ANNALS, 
supra note 40, at 1058 (reflecting that the drafting committee was charged with carrying over nec-
essary language from the 1790 Act to complete the new bill).  However, nothing indicates why the 
Committee made the change or why Madison went along with it. 
 141 That is especially true because English practice does not indicate a limit on retroactivity.  As dis-
cussed, English statutes routinely conveyed natural born status on categories of persons already 
born.  See supra Part II.B. 
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whose citizenship does not arise from birth is a “born” citizen.  In contrast, 
one may plausibly say that “natural born” means “conveyed by birth”; while 
that reading makes the words somewhat superfluous, it is not an uncommon 
phrasing.  A “natural born leader,” for example, means simply a person born 
with leadership qualities, with the word “natural” being largely superfluous. 
Further, with one exception, Parliament never gave persons with no con-
nections to England at birth the full status of natural born subjects.  It is true, 
as discussed, that Parliament at various times purported to declare persons 
with no connection to England at birth to be “natural born subjects” based 
on subsequent activities (serving in the wartime navy, etc.).  However, these 
statutes did not convey full natural born subject status; each of them con-
tained the “disabling clause” mandated by the Act of Settlement, which lim-
ited their subjectship rights—in particular, their eligibility to office. The only 
persons granted full natural born subject status (including eligibility to office) 
by statute were those who had material connections to England at birth be-
cause their parents or grandparents were English subjects.142   
The one exception to this pattern tends to prove the rule.  In the 1708 
Act, Parliament declared all foreign Protestants, regardless of the circum-
stances of their birth, to be natural born English subjects, without limitation 
as to eligibility to office.143  This gesture proved immediately unsatisfactory, 
was quickly repealed144 and was not repeated.  
Second, it is doubtful that Congress could convey natural born status on 
a particular individual without giving all similarly situated persons equivalent 
status.  Again, Parliament did not exercise its naturalization power in this 
way.  Some English naturalization acts did declare certain persons by name 
to be natural born subjects, but they went on to convey equivalent status 
categorically on all persons similarly situated.145   
Recognizing these limits on Congress’s naturalization power would help 
prevent the intrigues that concerned the Framers, while leaving Congress sub-
stantial definitional flexibility.  To take the example of Baron von Steuben, 
whom Professor Thach thought John Jay had in mind in first suggesting the 
Eligibility Clause:146  Steuben was born in Germany of non-U.S. parents and 
with no connection to the United States.  He later came to the United States 
	
 142 See supra Part II.B. 
 143 1708 Act, supra note 67. 
 144 1711 Act, supra note 67; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *363. 
 145 See supra Part II.B.  This limit also may be suggested by the naturalization clause, which only gives 
Congress power to make a uniform rule of naturalization.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  While the 
primary meaning of that phrase was no doubt to contrast with the non-uniform practices of the states, 
it may also suggest that a naturalization rule must be equally applicable to similarly situated persons. 
 146 See THACH, supra note 23. 
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and gained fame as an aide to Washington in the Revolutionary War.147  Un-
der no plausible definition of “natural born” was he a “natural born citizen.”  
Once the Constitution took effect, Congress could have made him a natural-
ized citizen at any time, but could not have made him a “natural born” citi-
zen.148  Similarly, to the extent there was concern over rumored invitations to 
foreign nobles to assume the presidency, again the requirement of “natural 
born,” even if subject to some legislative definition, would preclude such 
intrigues in a way that a mere citizenship requirement would not. 
As a result, though the Constitution gave Congress power to define who 
is natural born under its naturalization power, English practice and the 
purposes of the Eligibility Clause suggest that Congress’s power extended 
only to categories of persons with some material connection to the United 
States at birth.149 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom holds that “natural born Citizen” in the Constitu-
tion’s Eligibility Clause means anyone who is made a U.S. citizen at birth 
under then-existing statutory language.  However, that is not the most obvi-
ous reading of the clause.  The Constitution’s reference to “natural” citizen-
ship appears on its face to be a reference to citizenship conveyed by natural 
	
 147 PAUL LOCKHART, THE DRILLMASTER OF VALLEY FORGE: THE BARON DE STEUBEN AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN ARMY 106 (2008).  
 148 In fact, however, von Steuben was a citizen of the United States at the time of the Constitution’s 
ratification, having been made a citizen of both Pennsylvania and New York.  Id. at 295.  Thus he 
was eligible to the presidency under the final version of the Constitution; it is not clear if Jay knew 
von Steuben was a citizen, and in any event the alternative eligibility rule was not in Jay’s proposal. 
 149 A related puzzle is whether Congress could declare certain categories of persons not to be natural 
born citizens.  As to persons not natural born under common law, the likely answer is yes.  English 
statutory practice both expanded and contracted the definition of “natural born” over the course 
of the eighteenth century.  See supra Part II.B.  As to persons who had natural born status under 
common law, the question is more difficult, but there is no direct English precedent for doing so; in 
any event the question appears to have been mooted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s declaration 
that all persons born in the United States are citizens. 
A further difficulty in modern law is that the current naturalization law declares most persons 
born outside the United States to a U.S. citizen parent to be U.S. citizens, but it does not declare that 
they are “natural born” citizens.  As discussed, the 1790 Act used the phrase “natural born” in this 
context, but that language was dropped in the 1795 Act; subsequent enactments have followed the 
1795 Act in this regard.  Thus, while Congress has power to declare persons born outside the United 
States to a U.S. citizen parent to be “natural born” citizens, perhaps it has not done so.  A full exam-
ination of this question is beyond the scope of this Article; it is worth noting, however, that Congress 
seems plainly to understand its Acts as making persons who are citizens at birth eligible to the presi-
dency.  See, e.g., S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (unanimously finding John McCain, who 
was born in the Panama Canal Zone and thus arguably outside U.S. territory, to be a natural born 
citizen by prior statute).  This resolution generally refers to the children of Americans serving in the 
military (not just those in McCain’s situation) and specifically notes the 1790 Act.  As a result, it seems 
clear that the resolution based its conclusions on McCain’s birth abroad to U.S. parents. 
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law (exactly the opposite of citizenship conveyed by statute).  That has in turn 
led to considerable debate about the eighteenth-century “natural” law of cit-
izenship, which is in turn uncertain depending on whether one looks at Eng-
lish common law, English statutory law, or law-of-nations principles es-
poused by writers such as Vattel.  However, little direct evidence exists as to 
which view of natural law the Framers might have held.  Under this line of 
inquiry, the better conclusion may be that the clause is inescapably ambigu-
ous as to certain groups of citizens—a position suggested or embraced by 
several leading scholars.150 
As set forth above, careful review of the phrase’s history suggests that the 
conventional view is the best one, although the argument is more difficult 
and complex than the conventional view acknowledges.  The decisive fact 
about the phrase “natural born” is that it had commonly appeared in English 
statutes throughout the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  In tradi-
tional English common law, “natural born” (applied to “subjects”) meant 
(with minor exceptions) persons born within English territory.  However, be-
ginning in 1677, and continuing up to the Framers’ time, Parliament had 
expanded that definition by statute to include some persons born abroad to 
English parents.  Crucially, Parliament had not merely extended the rights 
of natural born subjects to these new categories, but had declared that per-
sons in the new categories were natural born subjects.  As Blackstone put it, 
children so designated by statute “are now natural-born subjects themselves, 
to all intents and purposes, without any exception . . . .”151 
This English practice was known to the Framers (at minimum, through 
Blackstone’s description).  And absent any other conclusive definition of the 
phrase, it seems conclusive in itself.  The Framers knew that in English law 
“natural born” had a core meaning of birth within sovereign territory, but 
was subject to statutory expansion to include those born overseas with what 
Parliament considered a sufficient connection to the nation.  The best read-
ing of the clause is that this is the constitutional meaning as well.152 
This reading is strongly reinforced by the Constitution’s grant to Congress 
of the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  The English 
statutes declaring certain categories of people to be natural born, even if not 
	
 150 See Solum, supra note 6, at 30 (discussing the “[p]ossibility of [i]rreducible [a]mbiguity” in interpret-
ing the Eligibility Clause); see also Jacobson, supra note 6 (concluding that, because of the ambiguity 
of the Framers’ intent, a “reasonable reading of the plain text” of the clause should be embraced, 
under which all citizens at birth would be “natural born”).  
 151 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *361. 
 152 This reading is consistent with the clause’s apparent purpose, which was to bar from the presidency 
people who lacked longstanding attachment to the United States.  Like people born in the United 
States, people born of U.S. parents abroad have an attachment to the United States from birth.  
The Framers’ concern was with people who only became U.S. citizens later in life, who thus (they 
feared, perhaps unreasonably) might have more attachment to foreign interests, and in particular 
might scheme to establish foreign rule.  See supra notes 19–40 and accompanying text. 
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born in England, were called naturalization acts.  Thus eighteenth-century 
readers would understand the naturalization power to include the power 
(within certain limits) to define the scope of “natural” birth.  As a result, some-
what counter-intuitively, “natural” born does at least to some extent depend 
on statutory law.  Finally, this reading explains the 1790 Act, in which Con-
gress created a statutory definition of “natural born” for children of U.S. citi-
zens born abroad that largely (but not entirely) tracked English practice. 
Notably, this reading (and only this reading) of the Eligibility Clause sup-
ports the modern view that all persons defined as citizens at birth by statute 
are “natural born.”  In particular, the modern citizenship statute defines 
most persons born abroad with a U.S. citizen mother and a non-citizen fa-
ther to be U.S. citizens at birth.  That status is not consistent with the mean-
ing of “natural born” in English common law or in law-of-nations theory; 
nor was it the case under late-eighteenth-century English statutory law 
(which gave those born abroad “natural born” status only if their fathers or 
paternal grandfathers were English subjects).  But so long as we see that “nat-
ural born” was subject to statutory expansion under the naturalization 
power, the fact that modern birthright citizenship does not accord in all par-
ticulars with eighteenth-century birthright citizenship is not problematic. 
In sum, as conventional wisdom holds, the best reading of the original 
meaning of the Eligibility Clause is that any person defined as a citizen at 
birth by the Constitution or a statute is eligible to the presidency.  The proof, 
however, is much more difficult than conventional wisdom supposes. 
